_Original Article_

# **Cultural co-orientation revisited:** **The case of the South China** **_Morning Post_**


**Felix Wiebrecht**

East China Normal University, China


**Abstract**

The freedom of press is one aspect that leaders from the West often criticise about China. As
former British colony, Hong Kong has been able to preserve its special status with constitutional
rights and liberties that also include the freedom of press. However, in recent years, sentiments
of increased influence from Beijing have led to fears that it would curb the freedoms enjoyed
by residents of the Special Administrative Region. However, instead of clear unambiguous
interferences, Beijing has opted for an indirect approach that is predominantly characterised by
the salience of economic considerations in reporting news binding the media outlets closer to the
position of Beijing. This article shows that the _South China Morning Post_ has undergone an editorial
shift that moves it closer to the position of the Chinese government.


**Keywords**
Agenda setting, communication research methods, content analysis, mass (media)
communication, organisational communication, ownership (concentration/competition), policy,
policy and law, political communication, public relations


The freedom of press is one aspect that leaders from the West often criticise about China. As former
British colony, Hong Kong has been able to preserve its special status with constitutional rights and
liberties that also include the freedom of press. However, in recent years, sentiments of increased
influence from Beijing have led to fears that it would curb the freedoms enjoyed by residents of the
Special Administrative Region (SAR). However, instead of clear unambiguous interferences,
Beijing has opted for an indirect approach that is predominantly characterised by the salience of


**Corresponding author:**
Felix Wiebrecht, Department of Politics, East China Normal University, 3663 North Zhongshan Road, Shanghai 200062,
China.

[Email: felixwiebrecht@yahoo.de](mailto:felixwiebrecht@yahoo.de)


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work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).


economic considerations in reporting news binding the media outlets closer to the position of
Beijing. This article will set out to assess whether the most influential English language newspaper
in Hong Kong has also undergone an editorial shift. First, it will provide a brief background to the
issue of mainland influence in Hong Kong media before proceeding to a content analysis illustrating such a shift.


**Beijing’s indirect influences on the post-1997 Hong Kong media**


Fears that Hong Kong’s freedoms of press and speech would be curtailed have a long history and,
in fact, were sparked ever since the handover to China had been decreed. Instead of remaining one
of the freest societies in Asia, observers were worried that China would apply the same rules and
standards known from the mainland to the media in Hong Kong. The state of the media environment has since then also become an issue of heated debates among scholars. Ching (1998) was
among the first assessing the situation after the handover and future prospects for Hong Kong
media. He depicts a reasonably positive picture concerning the media’s independence in Hong
Kong. Ching describes that in the first 3 months after the handover, nothing significant has changed.
In terms of formal restrictions, the only legal changes that had an effect on journalists’ work were
the suppression of open advocacy for independence, for both Taiwan and Hong Kong. However,
this change did not affect the practical reality of the mass media as these were positions that did not
find their way into the public sphere. Ching mainly attributes the absence of significant changes to
the fact that China has no intention to replicate its system in Hong Kong. Instead, he claims, Hong
Kong will be able to govern itself in most areas. According to Ching, a much greater concern for
journalism than direct interference from Beijing is the widely practised self-censorship. Journalists
and corporations abstain from reporting some news because they fear that this might lead to disadvantages to them or their employer initiated by Beijing. Nevertheless, Ching finds that this situation has been a pressing one already and has not been affected drastically by the handover. Overall,
he holds that ‘the prospects for a free press in Hong Kong seem reasonably bright’ (Ching, 1998,
p. 225), mainly due to his reckoning that the situation will not change considerably in the future.
One year later, Ching had not broken with his optimism. He finds that the legal and institutional
situation had not changed significantly in regard to the freedom of press in Hong Kong. Pointing
to the great self-interest that China has in maintaining the status quo in Hong Kong, he maintains,
‘I believe that Hong Kong newspapers are likely to continue functioning pretty much as they have
in the past’ (Ching, 1999, p. 10).
Scholars writing more recently confirm this situation. Direct interferences into the working of
Hong Media have largely been absent. Instead, the mainland has opted for an approach of more
‘indirect and subtle methods to domesticate the Hong Kong media’ (Lee, 2007, p. 436). Most
importantly, media outlets in Hong Kong are now overwhelmingly owned by corporations that
have relations to either the mainland or economic interests there. This development cannot be
solely attributed to the return of Hong Kong to China. In fact, scholars point out that this development has begun prior to the handover already (Fung & Lee, 1994). However, this trend only intensified in the post-1997 circumstances. In his study relating to the change of ownership in the media
environment in Hong Kong, Fung (2007) holds that ‘the Chinese authorities rely largely on alliances and _guanxi_ : there are businessmen who have close ties the Chinese authorities or have huge
investments in China, the success of which depends very much on the policy and ad hoc regulations’ (p. 161). He further finds that the similar ownership situation of most of the print media leads
to a convergence of political positions that is increasingly pro-Beijing. Although the owners of the


media are unlikely to be directly involved in the everyday news reporting, they can nevertheless
influence the corporate behaviour, for instance, through personnel decisions or resource allocation
(Lee, 2007b).
On the surface then, the media environment has changed little in terms of its freedom to report
any news. However, with the change of ownership and the increased competition and commercialisation of newspapers, internal shifts have definitely taken place. Ngok (2007) holds that ‘the media
were still free to report on government misdeeds, and criticisms of government scandals and policies were sometimes vehement. However, insider’s views revealed significant self-censorship and
editorial shift after 1997’ (p. 960). In fact, self-censorship had been circled out as the most pressing
concern for the freedom of the press in Hong Kong since 1997. Following Lee’s (1998) definition,
self-censorship describes


a set of editorial actions ranging from omission, dilution, distortion, change of emphasis, to choice of
rhetorical devices by journalists, their organisations, and even the entire media community in anticipation
of currying reward and avoiding punishment from the power structure.


According to Fung (2007), the most contentious topics concern Taiwan independence, separatism
in China and _Falun Gong_ . Lee and Chan (2007) have authored an influential study among journalists tracing the procedures of self-censorship in media outlets. They find that the phenomenon
cannot be linked back to individual journalists’ decisions but are institutionalised in indirect ways.
This article wants to focus on the second aforementioned trend among media outlets in Hong
Kong, namely that of the editorial shift within the newspapers in moves towards more pro-Beijing
positions. Previous content analyses (e.g. Leung, 1999) have already discovered that different
newspapers are portraying the Beijing government in a more positive light than the Hong Kong
government.
Lee (2007) further concludes in one of his articles that the combination of


changes in media personnel, practices of self-censorship, the turn to objective journalism by some news
organisations, rise and fall of critical media outlets, changes in journalists’ attitudes, and changes in
public opinion at large combine to generate a press that has become less critical towards China over the
years. (p. 145)


All these factors have led to a cultural co-orientation according to Lee. In other words, it describes
a process by which the media becomes more aware of the Chinese position and adopts a position
closer to that due to increased contact with each other following the return of Hong Kong. Lee
(2007) also defines this process as ‘the acquisition of better information and achievement of
increased understanding between two individuals or groups through interactions, which may lead
to convergence in attitudes towards external objects and mutual agreement on issues’ (p. 14). The
inherent result is that the positions portrayed in the media will increasingly resemble that of the
official Chinese position. Domestication of the media in Hong Kong has therefore been very successful in the eyes of China. The mainland has successfully managed to influence media in Hong
Kong and pull it closer to its position without exercising any direct influence that would have
curbed the freedom of press in the SAR.
According to Lee, the conflict potential has switched though. It is not national issues anymore
that could lead to disputes between Hong Kong and China. Instead, issues that concern Hong Kong
directly bear the greatest challenge for news reporting. National topics such as Taiwan or Tibet


independence do not provide a cleavage anymore since the Hong Kong media has, partly due to
non-fixed standards of what constitutes ‘reporting news’ and ‘advocating’ these, avoided these
altogether. This is probably even more true now than it was at the time of Lee’s article. The growing sense of a distinct local identity has caught the media in a conflict between Chinese interests
and the local opinion.
It is worth reflecting on these issues again as the concerns regarding Beijing’s indirect influence
on the media in Hong Kong have become even more pronounced in recent years. As reports suggest, Beijing has become less restrained in its efforts to manipulate local media. Self-censorship
has worsened in recent years as a result of the ever growing dependence on the mainland
(Anonymous, 2014) – in recent years, the issue of media ownership, physical attacks on journalists
and the publication of confessions made by Chinese activists (Koponen, 2017).
This article wants to contribute to the literature concerning the position of Hong Kong’s media.
In the following, it will analyse the editorial stance of the _South China Morning Post_ (SCMP) in
recent years. The SCMP has perhaps been one of the most controversial cases in Hong Kong. That
the paper is nowadays lacking its traditionally widely acclaimed critical stance towards China is
not a new phenomenon. The abovementioned development towards co-orientation already became
visible with the ousting of the China-critical chief editor Willy Lam in 2000 already (Lee & Chan,
2009). Several other controversies concerning alleged self-censorship have contributed to damaging the reputation of the paper. However, one of the most severe accusations of a growing Chinese
influence on the newspaper was linked to the acquisition by Alibaba in 2016. Several authors (e.g.
Allen-Ebrahimian & Wertime, 2015; Bandurski, 2015) have voiced their fear that this is likely to
further contribute to the co-orientation of Hong Kong and mainland media outlets.


**Why independence/greater autonomy?**


Following Lee’s concept of cultural co-orientation, this article hypothesises that the SCMP has also
moved closer to the official position of the Chinese government. In accordance with other scholars’
claim that national issues will not be a likely source of conflict between the central government and
media in Hong Kong anymore, this analysis will focus on issues in Hong Kong. This article is
focused on the issue of Hong Kong independence, autonomy or self-determination, depending on
which term proponents prefer. This issue falls in line with Lee and Lin’s (2006) study that focuses
on the issue of democratisation in the SAR. It was pointed out that this is an important issue to
analyse regarding the situation of the freedom of the press in Hong Kong. They held that


it involved conflicts between national and local interests, which present a dilemma to the Hong Kong
media. They risk losing their audience’s trust if they betray the local interests of democratisation. Yet
protecting local interests would mean pitting oneself against the Chinese government. (Lee and Lin, 2006,
p. 337)


In the following, this article will illustrate why the issue of independence or greater autonomy for
Hong Kong also corresponds to these criteria.


**The Chinese government’s stance on Hong Kong independence**


In order to follow a possible shift of the SCMP’s editorial stance closer towards the positions of the
Chinese government, this study will put a focus on the question of increased autonomy for Hong


Kong. This issue appears to be useful for an analysis because the public debate around it highlights
divergences of the Chinese government’s stance and that of the public opinion in Hong Kong. The
following section will set out to illustrate these discrepancies that make the issue valuable to this
article’s discussion.

The Chinese government has made its position on a possible independence of Hong Kong very
perspicuous. Most explicitly so by Premier Li Keqiang who addressed the issue in his opening
speech at the National People’s Congress in 2017 claiming that calls for independence within Hong
Kong ‘would lead nowhere’ (found in Griffiths, 2017). Similar statements have been made earlier
by other high-rank officials, for instance, by the head of China’s Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office,
Wang Guangyan, who held that ‘Hong Kong is an inseparable part of the country, and under no
circumstance is “Hong Kong independence” allowed. This is a bottom line that cannot be touched
in “one country, two systems”’ (found in Blanchard, 2016). While these are more recent expressions of the Beijing government, the general aversion towards any kind of independence movement or demands for more autonomy from Hong Kong has previously been illustrated in the
handling of the so-called Umbrella movement. The central leadership showed that it was not willing to make any concessions to the protesters about the election format. Furthermore, Beijing
showed a firm stance by intervening into the affairs of the Hong Kong Legislative council that
banned two pro-democracy lawmakers on demands from the Communist Party of China (CCP)
leadership (see, for instance, Chen, 2017). The development in recent years therefore shows that
Beijing does not accept any demands for increased autonomy for Hong Kong and appears to be
willing to exert influence in local affairs to an ever-greater extent, as, for instance, Albert (2017)
points out by asserting that ‘Beijing seems to be tightening its posture toward Hong Kong’s
governance’.


**Public opinion in Hong Kong**


Although Hong Kong public opinion is by no means unequivocally swayed towards advocating
independence for the Special Administrative Zone, one can still find conflict potential when comparing public opinion survey results to Beijing’s firm standpoint. In the Tenth Round of the ‘Hong
Kong Public Opinion & Political Development’ Opinion Survey (2017) authored by the Centre for
Communication and Public Opinion Survey of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the public’s
attitudes are well illustrated. Only 11.3% of the respondents show support for the idea of an independent Hong Kong after 2047. This is a clear minority also considering that to 60.2% this idea
does not appeal, with the rest of the respondents having no clear stance on this question. Also, if
asked whether Hong Kongers are open to the idea of direct governance by Beijing, only 14.7% are
supportive of that idea. The most attractive option for survey participants appears to be the continuation of the ‘one country, two systems’ approach beyond 2047 which is supported by 71.2% of the
respondents.
In wave 9 of the report (2016), the respondents showed a greater deal of support for the idea of
an independent Hong Kong. About 6.2% of respondents in 2016 ‘strongly agree’ that Hong Kong
should be an independent entity after 2047, while another 11.2% ‘somewhat agree’ to this suggestion. The survey did not ask respondents about their attitude towards independence for Hong Kong
after 2047 prior to 2016. Therefore, this study is unfortunately unable to illustrate a long-term
development of public opinion towards this issue and can only illustrate that support for independence has declined from 2016 to 2017. However, the mere fact that this question was not part of the
survey until 2016 could be taken as evidence that the issue just recently entered the public debate.


If understood in this way, it shows that it has become a greater concern for the public in Hong Kong
and that its support has received a boost in popularity preceding 2016 and was thus able to enter
the public debate.
However, these questions only consider the possible options for Hong Kong’s further development after 2047 when the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1997 that necessitates the ‘One country,
two systems’ approach expires. Another aspect that illustrates divergence between the central government’s stance and the public opinion in Hong Kong is the issue of more autonomy under the
‘one country, two systems’. Unfortunately, it has not been asked in the 2017 survey, so this article
utilises the results from 2016. Discernibly there is a high demand for autonomy among Hong Kong
residents. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 meaning Hong Kong ‘should have full autonomy’, the
mean value lies at 7.45. This is a relatively high score, especially taking under consideration how
Hong Kong residents see the current status of their autonomy. On the same scale, on average the
respondents see the current level of autonomy at 5.05. Consequently, one can infer that the residents of Hong Kong do not see the level of autonomy they desire for Hong Kong as being realised,
or in other words, one might infer that there is a demand for greater autonomy. Interestingly, there
is also a clear generational effect on this aspect. The respondents between the age of 15 and 24 are
agreeing to a great extent that Hong Kong should have a fair deal of autonomy, represented by the
scores 6–10 on the scale which 93.5% of the respondents from that age group have chosen. In
contrast to that, only 65.4% of the respondents above the age of 60 opine that Hong Kong should
have a great deal of autonomy. The average scores from both age groups are 7.91 and 7.04, respectively. A similar picture becomes apparent when looking at the question of how the respondents
think about the current situation of Hong Kong autonomy. Younger respondents consider the current level of autonomy as lower than respondents from older age groups. On average, young
respondents believe that the score of 4.64 describes the current level of Hong Kong’s autonomy,
whereas older respondents set this score at 5.71. However, throughout all different age groups, the
factor they give to the current level of autonomy is lower than the level of autonomy they would
like to see for Hong Kong. Consequently, a higher demand for autonomy is characteristic of all age
groups in Hong Kong and appears to be the mainstream position within Hong Kong’s society.
There is unfortunately not much data available that could illustrate the development of the
demands for autonomy. Only two surveys in 2015 and one in 2016 asked this question. Both coefficients have gone through similar developments. In 2015, the mean of the perceived level of
autonomy declined from 5.07 in March to 4.89 in June. Similarly, the level of autonomy that Hong
Kong should have according to the respondents also dropped from 7.11 in March to 6.79 in June.
In 2016, however, both figures increase to coefficients of 5.05 and 7.45, respectively. While the
divergence between the perceived level of autonomy and the level of autonomy Hong Kong should
have remained relatively stable compared to the 2015 surveys, it experiences a relatively sharp rise
in 2016 and reaches a difference of 2.4 points between the means. This illustrates that the public’s
opinion about the actual autonomy of Hong Kong increasingly deviates with the demand of autonomy they have. Therefore, one can infer that Hong Kong residents are increasingly unsatisfied with
the issue of autonomy. This ties back to the divergence of Hong Kong public opinion and the stance
of the Beijing government.
Another worthwhile aspect is the respondents’ satisfaction with the central government’s implementation of ‘one country, two systems’ in Hong Kong. Respondents in Hong Kong are not very
convinced about the current situation but at the same time also not entirely critical about it. On a
scale between 0 and 10, the mean value lies at a factor of 5.17 and therefore corresponds to the


response of ‘So-so’. This is insofar interesting for this study as it conveys the information that there
is a sentiment of dissatisfaction with the way the current configuration between Hong Kong and
mainland China is being governed. Although the year 2017 marks an improvement of the public
opinion of the central government’s implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ approach,
this does not disqualify the point of this section as the level of satisfaction remains on a similar
level. One can assess that the satisfaction with the government’s implementation of ‘one country,
two systems’ has seen a decline from 2014 when the surveys started up until 2016. From a mean
value of 4.99 in December 2014 it decreased to an average of 4.77 in July 2016. Only in 2017 the
central government receives a boost in appreciation for its approach on the ‘one country, two systems’ principle as it reaches a mean of 5.17.
Another aspect that needs to be considered for this study is that of the local Hong Kong identity.
Following Lau (1997), the colonial history of Hong Kong, a sense of superiority over the mainland
and judgements against the Communist regime form the basis of a local Hong Kong identity. While
earlier studies (e.g. Fung, 2007) suggest that the proportions of Hong Kong residents who identify
as ‘Hong Kong people’, ‘Chinese’ or both remained relatively stable in the aftermath of the handover and in the early 2000s, recent development points towards a more local identity being formed.
According to Fernando Cheung, a Hong Kong lawmaker, ‘many young Hong Kongers have begun
to see themselves as a different ethnicity from mainland China’ (found in Schmitz, 2016).
Interestingly, there has been a generational shift in terms of identification as a Hong Kong
University poll in 2016 ‘shows that, for the first time, a majority of city residents call themselves
“Hong Kongers” instead of “Hong Kongers in China”’ (Schmitz, 2016). This points to a development that accelerated in recent years, and especially young people are more likely to term themselves ‘Hong Konger’.
Therefore, one can see that while the Chinese government’s position on issues of autonomy and
independence is clear, Hong Kong residents appear to become more disaffected from Beijing and
develop a local identity. This is expressed by the demand for more autonomy, both illustrated by
the statistics, as well as for developments in the political reality of Hong Kong, that is, the Umbrella
Movement as well as the election of pro-independence candidates. Similarly, the growing level of
people identifying themselves as ‘Hong Kongers’ as well as the constantly low level of satisfaction
of the implementation of the ‘one country, two systems’ approach points to a conflict between
central government’s stance and the public opinion in Hong Kong.


**Methodology**


This study will employ content analysis to show whether the editorial stance of the SCMP has
shifted recently. Berelson (1952) defined content analysis as ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications’ (p. 74). The
study has analysed 63 different articles in total, all published by the SCMP (for a complete list, see
References). The central assumption of the article is that the acquisition of the SCMP by Alibaba
is also a significant element contributing to the cultural co-orientation. Undoubtedly, the change of
ownership will lead to enhanced opportunities for exchange and communication between the Hong
Kong journalists and the mainland owners. The position of the newspaper is therefore expected to
move closer to that of the Beijing government. In order to track a development of the editorial
stances, the creation of different phases was of essential importance. Phase 1 deals with articles
from January 2015 until 11 December 2015 as this is the date when it was announced that Alibaba


would become owner of the SCMP. The second period includes articles from that date until 5 April
2016 as the acquisition had been finalised on that day. The final phase deals with articles from 5
April 2016 up until today, with the most recent one being from 11 June 2017. All of the articles
have been found through a search for the keywords ‘independence’, ‘autonomy’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘localism’. While the study seems to have included a great share of the articles dealing
with these aspects in the first phase, the study had to be more selective for phases 2 and 3. In 2015,
the independence issue did not seem to play a great role in the public agenda, and therefore, it was
rather difficult to find a good sample of articles. In phases 2 and 3, however, this study employed
a random sampling approach as there was a much higher number of articles available dealing with
the abovementioned issues. The sample of articles includes 22 articles from phase 1, 20 articles
from phase 2 and 21 articles from phase 3. The content analysis aimed at identifying the amount of
mentions of the terms ‘independence’, ‘autonomy’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘localism’.
Furthermore, it also identified all actors involved in the sampled articles as well as their quotes
referred to in the articles.


**Findings**


First, this study has looked at the frequency of the use of the term ‘independence’ related to Hong
Kong. The findings here show a clear trend (see Figure 1) towards a steady increase in the usage
of the term. The concept has only been mentioned 73 times in total, 3.32 times per article and 1.11
times per page in phase 1. The amount of mentions increases in phase 2 to 83 times in total, 3.32
times per article and 1.48 times per page. In phase 3, however, one can find a climax as the word
‘independence’ has been used 117 times in total, 5.57 times per article and 1.92 times per page.
Therefore, one can assess a clear tendency in the longitudinal data illuminating an increase in
the usage of the concept of ‘independence’. One might infer that as the SCMP gives more space
towards the debate of the concept, the hypothesis of this study might be falsified. However, this
does not accurately reflect the situation assessed here. One needs to note that the concept of independence has only been used by ‘extremists’ within the political spectrum of Hong Kong prior to
2014. The idea was thus almost non-existent in the public debate. If articles from the SCMP predating the pieces analysed here would be taken under scrutiny, one would likely find an even smaller
amount of references to ‘independence’. During this analysis, however, this study found that it was
significantly easier to find articles dealing with the issue of independence in phases 2 and 3. In
other words, an increased use of the concept of ‘independence’ does not necessarily indicate the
editorial stance towards it, merely that the concept has become more prominent in the public arena
(Table 1).
As can be taken from Table 1, the use of the concept of ‘autonomy’ has generally been very
limited. However, it appears to be the expression favoured by mainland officials emphasising the
current degree of ‘autonomy’ that Hong Kong has and that makes it stand out from other parts of
China.

The case of the usage of the concept of ‘self-determination’ looks more revealing (Table 2). One
can infer a pronounced trend from this development as the references to self-determination have
frequented throughout the different phases. From only 5 indications in total in phase 1, the amount
increased to 8 in total in phase 2 and, finally, to 21 in total and 1 per article in phase 3. Again, the
increased usage of the concept does not necessarily tell much about the editorial stance of the
SCMP and does not contradict the hypothesis posed in this article. Rather, it shows that the concept
has found its way into the public debate and has received an enhancement in popularity. Similar to
the concept of ‘independence’, ‘self-determination’ used to be only advocated by a tiny fraction of


**Figure 1.** Uses of ‘independence’.


**Table 1.** Uses of ‘autonomy’.


Use of ‘autonomy’ Total Per article


Phase 1 9 0.41

Phase 2 4 0.2

Phase 3 4 0.19


**Table 2.** Use of ‘self-determination’.


Use of ‘self-determination’ Total Per article


Phase 1 5 0.23

Phase 2 8 0.4

Phase 3 21 1


‘radicals’ in Hong Kong that had almost no public influence. The data here therefore illustrate the
development of public debate in Hong Kong, with concepts of ‘independence’ and ‘self-determination’ becoming more prevalent. Beijing’s preferred concept of ‘autonomy’ can be said to have
seen a decline in usage in contrast, although it should not be overstated due to the small amount of
mentions in total. The first analysed article provides a very interesting example of the new concept
entering the public debate. In the article _Ex-university student leaders argue over Hong Kong inde-_
_pendence_, it is stated that


two generations of student leaders at the University of Hong Kong crossed swords on Sunday over the
issue of Hong Kong independence, after Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying accused the current students’
union of advocating self-determination for the city. (SCMP, 18 January 2015)


The two concepts are thereby used interchangeably, probably due to the absence of a public
debate about the concepts prior to this article. The article also illustrates the political landscape in


**Table 3.** Use of ‘localism’.


Use of ‘localism’ Total Per article


Phase 1 32 1.45

Phase 2 55 2.75

Phase 3 42 2


Hong Kong at the time of writing, January 2015, as it elevates students to the main proponents of
independence for Hong Kong. It is stated that ‘Hong Kong independence has become the latest hot
topic in town since Leung, in his policy address on Wednesday, accused HKU students’ union
magazine Undergrad of championing self-determination …’ (SCMP, 18 January 2015). This shows
that the newspaper included the students’ union as the main advocate of independence for Hong
Kong because the idea was lacking another political platform that was only established later.
In a similar manner, also the use of the concept of ‘localism’ experienced an increase in mentions (Table 3). Mentioned 32 times in total in phase 1, the use augments to 55 allusions in phase 2
and 2.75 per article. This figure declines in phase 3 though to 42 mentions in total and 2 per article.
An outstanding example of this is the article named _The bright side of localism: Hong Kong’s_
_finance minister sees a constructive sense of pride_ from December 2015. It was one the first examples of offering the opportunity to explain the concept of localism. Interestingly, in the mentioned
article, John Tsang’s positive account of localism is complemented by two supporters of his view
and contrasted with views from two opponents of localist movements. Only 1 day later, in the article _Mainland academic rings the alarm on the rise of ‘neo-localism’ in Hong Kong_ (SCMP, 28
December 2015), critical voices towards ‘neo-localism’ voiced by mainland scholars are not contrasted by any supporters at all. From phase 2 to phase 3, however, the focus seems to shift away
from ‘localism’ towards ‘self-determination’ and ‘independence’ in particular as these concepts
receive another boost in popularity in SCMP articles. This development can be explained due to the
unclear political nature of many of the localist groups in their initial stages. While in phase 2 their
voices become louder in the public debate, they were nevertheless in their initial stages of political
involvement and most of them lacked a pronounced political agenda. However, especially in the
lead-up to the Legco elections, the editors seem to have shifted from calling activists ‘localists’ to
terming them ‘pro-independence activists’ or similarly. A possible explanation for these findings
could be that the localist pro-independence camp in Hong Kong appears to have become more radical and more pronounced in seeking independence. This inference goes in line with political developments in Hong Kong, as, for instance, the Mong Kok protests, the founding of openly
pro-independence political parties such as the Hong Kong National Party or the oath controversy
illustrates. However, this shift towards more extremist approaches and advocacies has nevertheless
found support in the public, for instance, in the Legco elections. The first section of this study’s
analysis therefore illuminates the development of Hong Kong public debates rather than the editorial preferences of the SCMP. This issue will be the focus of the next sections.
In the next step, this analysis looks at the various actors that the SCMP decided to include in its
articles and that are mentioned in them.

Table 4 illustrates the actors that were mentioned in SCMP articles and unfortunately does not
provide a clear trend. The mainland officials’ share remains on a relatively constant level that deviates between 14.04% of all actors mentioned in articles in phase 1 and 20% in phase 2 before
decreasing again to a level of 15.05% in the final phase. Hong Kong officials are the actors that are


**Table 4.** Actors involved in SCMP articles.


Actor Phase 1 (%) Phase 2 (%) Phase 3 (%)


Mainland officials 14.04 20 15.05

Hong Kong officials 24.56 30 22.58
Independence activists 15.79 25 22.58
Pro-Beijing party members 7.89 3.75 4.3

Pan-Democrats 13.16 5 9.68

Hong Kong scholars 4.39 2.5 4.3

Mainland scholars 0.88 3.75 0

Students/Student unions 5.26 2.5 2.15

Other actors 13.16 [a] 7.5 [b] 19.35 [c]


a Include, for instance, Civil Human Rights Front, Occupy Central members whose stance on independence is not clearly
expressed, the _People’s Daily_ and Joshua Wong Chi-fung.
b Include, for instance, Joshua Wong Chi-fung and a US scholar.
c Include, for instance and especially, Joshua Wong Chi-fung and Demosistō, which is advocating self-determination but
not necessarily Hong Kong independence.


most present in all three phases. Their share varies between 22.58% and 30%. While reaching the
maximum in phase 2, they also experience a sharp decline in phase 3 putting them on an equal
share of actors with representatives from the pro-independence camp. The independence activists
have gained the second highest increase of all actors from phase 1 to phase 2 when their share
sparked from 15.79% to 25%. Again, this highlights the increased importance of pro-independence
campaigners in the public debate in Hong Kong. However, their share also declined in phase 3
when they only made up 22.58% of all actors in the analysed SCMP articles. Pro-Beijing party
members in Hong Kong who do not hold official positions in the government have become marginalised to some extent in SCMP articles, with their share declining from 7.89% in phase 1 to
4.3% in phase 3. The share of scholars from Hong Kong remains relatively stable, around 4% of
all actors. The group of actors involved receiving the largest gain of mentions is that of ‘other
actors’. While dropping from 13.16% in phase 1 to 7.5% in phase 2, references to them escalate to
19.35%. The main members of this group are Joshua Wong Chi-fung and the Demosistō party that
is advocating self-determination for Hong Kong’s future.
This development suggests that in phase 1 the public discourse was not overly concerned with
discussing potential independence for Hong Kong, and therefore, the share of actors advocating
independence was quite low with only 15.79%. In phase 2, however, terms such as ‘independence’,
‘self-determination’ and ‘localism’ have successfully entered the public debate and thus also
allowed independence activists to gain more presence in SCMP articles. The development also
shows a concentration of allusions to mainland officials, Hong Kong officials and independence
activists in phase 2. Together they make up 75% of all actors mentioned in that phase, and consequently, reporting shows a clear focus on these groups. Pan-Democrats as well as pro-Beijing party
members showed themselves unprepared and unable to manage this development efficiently and
therefore lost their voices in the public debate about Hong Kong’s autonomy status and future.
Only when adopting localism to a certain extent, the Pan-Democrats advance back onto the public
stage in phase 3.
The increase in the shares of mentions of Joshua Wong and Demosistō in phase 3 also reflects
what has been pointed out above regarding public opinion in Hong Kong. From 2016 to 2017,


**Table 5.** Actors’ representation in articles and proportion of actors’ quotes in articles compared.


Actor Phase 1 Phase 2 (%) Phase 3 (%)


Proportion
of articles

mentioned (%)


Proportion of
quotes in all
articles (%)


Mainland officials 14.04 10.91 20 20.89 15.05 22.53

Hong Kong officials 24.56 22.27 30 26.67 22.58 28.85
Independence activists 15.79 11.82 25 21.33 22.58 16.6
Pro-Beijing party members 7.89 14.55 3.75 3.11 4.3 4.74

Pan-Democrats 13.16 8.18 5 2.67 9.68 10.28

Hong Kong scholars 4.39 10.45 2.5 1.33 4.3 3.56

Mainland scholar 0.88 5.22 3.75 8.89 0 0

Students 5.26 0.45 2.5 1.78 2.15 0.79

Other actors 13.16 15.91 7.5 13.33 19.35 12.65


support for the idea of Hong Kong becoming an independent political entity after 2047 declined.
This can be related to the decline of actors mentioned in SCMP articles. While fewer independence
activists were mentioned in the final phase, especially the frequency of allusions to more ‘moderate’ forces such as Joshua Wong and Demosistō, also that of the Pan-Democrats, for instance,
increased. This might reflect that while independence might not be seen as a feasible option for
many sectors of society in Hong Kong, demands for more self-determination and more autonomy
are nevertheless existent and remain strong. In other words, the choice of including certain actors
in the SCMP articles appears to be more related to the public opinion rather than to a certain affiliation of the newspaper. However, this situation will be subject to further discussion in the next
section.

Finally, this study wants to go beyond scrutinising which actors have been mentioned in SCMP
report and also investigate the space the newspaper grants each of these actors. Therefore, this
study looks at the quotes of all actors one can find in the articles. This will illustrate how the SCMP
values each actor.

In Table 5, one can see the share of quotes of different actors that this study found in the analysed articles from the SCMP. Interestingly, these are quite different from the mentions of different
actors illustrated in Table 4. For instance, one can take from these statistics that the share of quotes
from mainland officials has been on the rise from phase 1. From 10.91% in phase 1 it saw a sharp
increase to 20.89% in phase 2 and, finally, to 22.53% in phase 3. Similarly, also the share of quotes
from Hong Kong officials experiences gradual gains, from 22.27% in phase 1 to 26.67% in phase
to 28.85% in the final phase. Hong Kong officials are therefore the group of actors that gets the
most quotes published in all three different phases. However, the picture looks different for independence activists. Although their share of quotes grew from 11.82% in phase 1 by almost 10
percentage points to 21.33% in phase 2, it also decreased again after that to 16.6%. No overall trend
can be seen for the Pan-Democrats, pro-Beijing party members, scholars from both the mainland
and Hong Kong, and students. Intriguingly, however, the share of quotes from other actors included
in SCMP articles has experienced a constant decline from phase 1 onwards. Starting from 15.91%
in the initial phase, it decreased to 13.33% in phase 2 and suffered a further drop to 12.65% in the
final stage of analysis.


These findings become especially interesting when one compares them to discoveries from
Table 4.

It becomes apparent that some groups have a higher share of quotes than their share of actors
would suggest. In other words, some actors are given more space in SCMP articles to express their
opinions than others, meaning that one can assess a potential bias against some actors and towards
others.

While mainland officials have experienced a bias against them in phase 1, this changed from
phase 2. In the second phase, the difference between their share of actors mentioned and their share
of quotes is only marginal, 0.89 percentage points. However, in the final phase, there is a large difference of more than 7 percentage points that illustrates a clear bias towards mainland officials. The
SCMP has quoted mainland officials to a much greater extent in the final phase than it has most of
the other actors which illustrates a strong bias towards them. They only represent 15.05% of the
actors mentioned in phase 3, but 22.53% of all quotes in that phase were issued by mainland
officials.

While Hong Kong officials have also been subject to discriminatory treatment in the first two
phases, they experience a preferential treatment in the final phase. In phase 3, there is a difference
of more than 6 percentage points between their share of actors and their share of quotes. The mainland officials who make up 22.58% of all actors in the final phase account for 28.85% of all quotes,
and therefore, it also shows a clear bias towards Hong Kong officials. The instance of independence activists is a contrasting case. Throughout all three phases they have experienced a bias
against them, culminating in a difference between share of actors and share of quotes of about
6 percentage points in the final phase. One article that illustrates this situation very well is named
_Accept Hong Kong is part of China or you can’t run in Legco elections_ (SCMP, 14 July 2016). This
article offers considerable space for the Hong Kong government officials to explain newly introduced rules to stand for elections in Hong Kong, while both Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor
and the independence advocate Edward Leung Tin-kei are only offered one sentence each to comment on the new legislation.
Similar to other findings, it is difficult to make pronounced conclusions about the development
of the biases for and against the Pan-Democrats, the pro-Beijing party members, and scholars from
Hong Kong and the mainland. Students, however, have been prone to discrimination in all three
phases. Interestingly, other actors have experienced preferential treatment in the first two phases
but saw the tides turning and a bias against them in the final phase.


**Discussions and implications**


As pointed out above, the public opinion of Hong Kong residents can to a great extent be followed
through the analysed articles. Concepts such as ‘independence’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘localism’ that have largely been unexplored prior to 2014 are increasingly used throughout the different
phases of this study. This suggests that these concepts have entered the public debate and have
therefore also been picked up by the SCMP that increased its reporting on these issues as a consequence. Supporting to this impression is also the fact that supporters of independence for Hong
Kong have increased their presence in articles. Thus, it is not only the concepts that are being discussed but also the independence advocates that are given a bigger platform provided by the SCMP.
This does not necessarily go against the hypothesis of this article because the importance of the
issue of independence for Hong Kong skyrocketed in recent years. Thus, anything but an increase
in the usage of concepts like ‘independence’ and a louder voice for independence supporters would


have been a failure of the SCMP to report news realistically. In other words, any idea that becomes
popular within any society needs to be reported notwithstanding the editorial stance towards it. In
phase 3, it is interesting that other actors such as Joshua Wong and Demosistō are mentioned more
often but do not necessarily gain a greater voice in SCMP articles. This can be linked back to Hong
Kong’s public opinion. As support for independence declined between July 2016 and June 2017,
the SCMP cut back on its references to pro-independence forces in Hong Kong and instead gave
more ‘moderate’ activists that would advocate Hong Kong’s self-determination but not necessarily
independence more opportunities to express their voices.
However, this article set out to explore whether the SCMP’s attitude has moved closer to the
position of the central government over time. As pointed out, phase 1 does not give much useful
insight towards this question as the issues of independence, autonomy and self-determination only
commenced to appear in the public debate during that time. Yet, some developments especially in
phase 3 point towards the validity of the hypothesis.
First, the preferential treatment to mainland officials and Hong Kong officials in terms of their
opportunities to express their opinions has become apparent. Mainland officials have been able to
gain a bigger share of the quotes than their share of actors would allocate them in both phases 2 and
3. Despite their share of actors declining quite considerably in phase 3, they were able to gain an
even bigger proportion of quotes. This development hints towards a good relationship between
editorial staff and mainland officials. Similarly, also Hong Kong officials gain a boost in their proportion in phase 3 despite having less actors in the articles, relatively speaking. Both instances
indicate that the SCMP puts a focus on presenting Beijing’s positions as well as Hong Kong officials’ stances on the issues related to independence, autonomy and localism.
Moreover, the same also applies in the opposite direction. Interestingly, throughout all three
phases independence advocates have experienced a bias against them. Despite being mentioned
fairly often especially in phase 3 where independence advocates gain the biggest share of actors
together with Hong Kong officials, they are lacking opportunities to voice their opinions. Yet, the
relative frequency of being mentioned or not mentioned is not the decisive point; rather, the development of the priorities set by the editors is. One priority of the editors appears to be not to publish
too many quotes from independence activists, while both mainland and Hong Kong officials were
able to increase their share of quotes constantly notwithstanding their development of share of
actors mentioned. Furthermore, also the share of other actors has consistently decreased. This
means that the losses for independence activists in their share of quotes did not transform into
gains, for instance, for Joshua Wong and Demosistō who form the largest part of the category
‘other actors’ and also advocate more self-determination. Therefore, a bias in the final phase is
found in favour of pro-Beijing forces, namely, mainland officials, Hong Kong officials and proBeijing party members as well as the Pan-Democrats who have been anything but unified in their
stance towards localism and also reject independence. These findings suggest that a shift in editorial priorities has taken place from the first phase to the third phase.
While it seems that the tendency of a bias has become stronger throughout the different phases,
one needs to be careful with taking this as a foregone conclusion. As independence has only entered
the public debate fairly recently, it is difficult to assess the editorial’s stance towards it. Observers
(e.g. Custer, 2015) have pointed out that, although once praised as one of the few media outlets that
covered topics that were untouched in mainland China, the editorial stance has already shifted
closer towards Zhongnanhai in the last decades. While the findings seem to suggest that the editors
are willing to reflect more official positions than in the past and, thus, that their editorial stance has


shifted towards a more positive look on Beijing’s policies and positions, the case of independence
as a newly emerging public debate in Hong Kong makes it difficult to validate this claim in a longterm perspective. Although this analysis ultimately cannot attest a causal link between the acquisition by Alibaba and the move towards the official position of Beijing, this assumption is not
far-fetched as Lee’s concept of cultural co-orientation has suggested.


**Conclusion**


This article set out to explore a potential shift of the SCMP’s editorial stance towards the position of Beijing with the assumption that the acquisition by Alibaba has contributed to this. A
controversial debate in recent years in Hong Kong that has illustrated conflicts between the position of the mainland government and Hong Kong’s public opinion is that of more autonomy and
potential independence for the SAR. The study has therefore explored several articles from three
different periods of time: before the acquisition was announced, after the acquisition was
announced but before it was finalised and after the acquisition had been finalised. First, it found
that the use of the term ‘independence’ has increased sharply in this time. Similarly, although not
with the same intensity, also ‘self-determination’ and ‘localism’ were used more often in SCMP
articles. This situation reflects the general development of public debate in Hong Kong, as these
terms were largely absent from the public stage but became increasingly popular in recent years.
In the following, the article investigated the actors that are mentioned in the articles used for
analysis. In phase 2, one can see a larger proportion of pro-independence activists; however, this
is more likely to be due to the general novelty of the idea and the rapid increase in popularity of
the concept rather than the SCMP’s support for the idea. Phase 3, however, shows a decrease in
independence advocates mentioned in the articles. Most importantly, this study was looking at
the relationship between the actors mentioned and their quotes expressed in the articles. It is
found that there has been a consistent bias against independence activists throughout all phases,
while especially mainland officials and Hong Kong officials were granted more quotes to publish. This is especially important in the final phase as it shows a development towards a more
pro-Beijing/pro-establishment position. It also seems that this tendency gained strength throughout the subsequent periods. Therefore, this research points towards a likely link between the
acquisition of the SCMP by Alibaba and the shift of the paper’s editorial stance closer to the
position of the central government. However, future research should attempt to find a clear
causal relationship between the two.


**Funding**


The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.


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**Articles in** _**South China Morning Post**_ **used for analysis (chronologically):**


Chun-Ying, L. (2015, January 18). _Ex-university student leaders argue over Hong Kong independence_ .
So, P., & Lam, J. (2015, February 5). _China’s man in Hong Kong Zhang Xiaoming hits out at democracy_

_protests_ .
Cheung, T., Cheung, G., & So, P. (2015, March 5). _‘One county, two systems’ for Hong Kong must comply_
_with China constitution, says Premier Li Keqiang_ .
Cheung, g., & Cheung, T. (2015, March 9). _Chinese law professor urges Hongkongers to reject calls for_
_independence_ .
Ng, J. (2015, April 9). _CY Leung denies report that Hong Kong plans to outlaw independence campaigns_ .
Ng, J. (2015, April 9). _‘No market’ for talk of Hong Kong independence, Jasper Tsang says_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, May 10). _Under national security law, Hongkongers free to call for an end to ‘Communist_
_Party’s dictatorship’: Elsie Leung_ .
Lam, J. (2015, June 2). _Is the rise of localism a threat to Hong Kong’s cosmopolitan values?_ .
Cheung, G., & Chan, S. (2015, June 4). _Hong Kong’s Tiananmen vigil in spotlight amid growth of localism_
_and alternative rallies_ .

Tiananmen Square crackdown (2015, June 5). _Hong Kong localists voice frustrations and call for independ-_
_ence at alternative rally for June 4_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, June 5). _Legco president defends Hong Kong’s role in China after students burn copy of_
_Basic Law_ .

Lo, A. (2015, June 12). _Two systems much better than just one_ .
Lam, J., Cheung, T., & Chan, S. (2015, June 16). _Bomb plot rattles nerves across Hong Kong, but lawmakers_
_play down threat from National Independent Party_ .
Lo, A. (2015, June 30). _Why Hong Kong localism has no future_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, June 30). _People’s Daily slams Hong Kong democracy demands as ‘impossible, ridicu-_
_lous’ ahead of July 1 March_ .
Ying-kit, L., & Zhao, S. (2015, July 2). _‘We don’t want Hong Kong independence’: July 1 March organisers_
_refuse to side with localists_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, September 14). _Unite to stop Hong Kong ‘moving towards radicalism’, urges leader of_
_city’s largest pro-Beijing party Starry Lee_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, September 16). _Beijing-loyalist Robert Chow Yung vows to continue campaign so that_
_Hong Kong does not become ‘another Syria’_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, September 21). _Hong Kong must ‘not make trouble’ to preserve freedom when ‘one coun-_
_try, two systems’ expire, warns former financial chief_ .
Cheung, T. (2015, September 22). _We don’t need another Occupy: Joshua Wong reveals new approach and_
_plan for referendum on Hong Kong’s post-2047 future_ .
Chugani, M., (2015, September 30). _One year after Occupy Central, the world is no longer buzzing to support_
_Hong Kong’s democracy_ .


Lam, J. (2015, October 13). _It’s time to resists Beijing, not hold talks, says once-moderate Hong Kong aca-_
_demic_ .

Kang-Chung, N. (2015, December 27). _The bright side of localism: Hong Kong’s finance minister sees a_
_constructive sense of pride_ .
Cheung, G. (2015, December 28). _Mainland academic rings the alarm on the rise of ‘neo-localism’ in Hong_
_Kong_ .
Cheung, T., & Lau, S. (2016, February 12). _Beijing signals less tolerant approach in branding instigators of_
_Mong Kok riots as Hong Kong ‘separatists’_ .
Lau, C. (2016, February 16). _Hong Kong localist group ‘knows no bounds’ when it comes to protesting, says_
_activists and by-election candidate_ .
Cheung, T. (2016, February 19). _New HKU student leader Althea Suen says independence is ‘viable way’ for_
_Hong Kong_ .
Tam, T. (2016, February 21). _The more Hong Kong’s radicals push for independence, the further they go_
_against mainstream view_ .
Leung, C. (2016, February 22). _‘No bottom line’: new Chinese University student leaders say they will resort_
_to violence if majority want it_ .
Lo, A. (2016, February 23). _Localist delinquent movement seeking independence makes fashionable move to_
_violence, but it’s a political dead end_ .
Chugani, M. (2016, March 1). _Just imagine an independent Hong Kong_ .
Cheung, T. (2016, March 4). _‘Misunderstandings’ partially to blame for rise of Hong Kong localism, top_
_party member says_ .
Cheung, G. (2016, March 4). _Beijing will not sit by and watch push for Hong Kong independence, top advisor_

_warns_ .

Cheung, T. (2016, March 6). _Involve Hong Kong’s young people more in decision making, Executive Council_
_member says_ .
Cheung, G. (2016, March 15). _Minority report: mainland Chinese official says Hong Kong separatists do not_
_represent the mainstream_ .
Lau, S., & Lam, J. (2016, March 16). _Hong Kong independence ‘impossible’, says Beijing legal official_ .
Lam, J. (2016, March 18). _Separatism is suicidal - US democracy expert urges Hong Kong activists to act_

_smarter_ .

Tam, T. (2016, March 20). _Hong Kong independence: waiting for the idea to go nowhere_ .
Chugani, M. (2016, March 22). _Localists form a majority in Hong Kong if what they advocate is opposing_
_mainlandisation_ .

Lam, J. (2016, March 30). _Forming party to push Hong Kong independence is ‘taking it too far’, wants pro-_
_China newspaper_ .
Siu, P. (2016, March 30). _Beijing slams creation of Hong Kong independence party, saying it endangers_
_national security_ .
Cheung, T. (2016, April 1). _Hong Kong chief secretary Carrie Lam says calls for independence from main-_
_land China ‘wrong’_ .
Ip, R. (2016, May 7). _Why talk of an independent Hong Kong fails the test of reality_ .
Lau, S. (2016, May 14). _Get your brains checked, minister tells Hong Kong localists_ .
Fung, O. (2016, May 16). _Chief Executive CY Leung blames Hong Kong voting system for independence calls_ .
Cheung, G. (2016, May 19). _Zhang offers olive branch, but stands solidly versus notion of Hong Kong inde-_
_pendence_ .
Lau, S., Cheung, G., & Fung, O. (2016, May 19). _Loyalty card: state leader’s ‘soft’ take on localism during_
_Hong Kong visit surprises analysts_ .
Cheung, T. (2016, May 21). _Beijing ‘has the laws, guns and cannons to prevent independence’, legal expert_

_warns_ .

Chugani, M. (2016, May 21). _Can Hong Kong’s leaders now win back the hearts and minds of the people?_ .


Ng, J. (2016, June 30). _Top Beijing official for Hong Kong claims pan-democrats can become ‘constructive_
_force’ in restless city_ .
Lo, A. (2016, July 1). _The real question Hong Kong must ask over ‘independence’_ .
Ng, J., & Kang-Chung, N. (2016, July 14). _‘Accept Hong Kong is part of China or you can’t run in Legco_
_elections’_ .

Cheung, T. (2016, July 20). _Don’t leg Legco elections become stage for promoting independence, warns_
_Beijing’s top man in Hong Kong_ .
Fung, O. (2016, July 21). _Won’t accept Hong Kong as part of China? You shouldn’t stand for election, Jasper_
_Tsang says_ .
Lau, S. (2016, July 22). _Why Hong Kong independence, localism, nativism and recolonisation worry main-_
_land China_ .

Cheung, T., & Cheung, G. (2016, August 13). _Hong Kong’s student’s transformation: from support for_
_Chinese athletes in 2008 to independence backers in 2016_ .
Zhao, S. (2016, August 16). _Can Hong Kong’s teachers really be banned from talking independence in class?_ .
Kao, E. (2016, September 8). _Ideas will disappear if they are false, Donald Tsang says in comments on Hong_
_Kong independence_ .
Fung, O. (2016, September 13). _‘A Hongkonger is someone willing to defend our values’: Baggio Leung on_
_his mission to make nationalism mainstream_ .

Siu, P. (2016, October 24). _Beijing worried about Legco oath saga and wants ‘clear bottom line’ on Basic_
_Law, ex-Hong Kong lawmaker claims_ .
Yeung, R. (2016, November 3). _Mainland paper slams Hong Kong independence advocates in 1,000-word_

_commentary_ .
Cheung, T. (2016, December 22). _Reverend Paul Kwong: Hong Kong independence movement is ‘destruc-_
_tive’ and ‘polarising’_ .
Kang-Chung, N. (2017, June 11). _Democrats vow to fight for greatest self-determination for Hong Kong, but_
_reject independence_ .


**Author biography**


Felix Wiebrecht is a graduate student at the East China Normal University, Shanghai. He previously graduated from University of Aberdeen and is a prospective PhD Candidate at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong.