

Supplementary Materials

“Impact of democracy on economic, human, and societal development.”

Table A1. Excluded Studied Comprehensive List

Reason for exclusion	Example of studies
Regime type: -not main independent variable	Abdullah et al. 2015 Abouharb et al 2019 Aisen and Veiga 2013 Altunbaş and Thornton 2020 Anthonsen et al 2012 Baskaran and Hessami 2012 Bell 2011 Benyishay and Betancourt 2010 Best and Burke 2017 Bisogno and Cuadrado-Ballesteros 2021 Bizarro et al. 2018 Bjørnskov 2010 Bleaney and Dimico 2011 Bogliaccini and Egan 2017 Bojanic and Collins 2019 Brancati and Snyder 2013 Brusca et al 2018 Cederman et al. 2010 Cole 2012 Combes et al. 2019 Detraz and Peksen 2017 Donno et al. 2022 ElGindi 2017 Evrensel 2010 Faria et al 2012 Feld and Schnellenbach 2014 Flores and Nooruddin 2012 Garcia and Von Haldenwang 2016 Goel et al 2012 Grigoli and Mills 2014 Gründler and Köllner 2017 Haggard and Tiede 2011 Heckelman and Wilson 2019 Holcombe and Boudreaux 2015 Jetter 2014 Keefer et al 2011 Kim and Lee 2016 Kourtellos et al 2019 Lalountas et al 2011 Lee and Lee 2018 Lee and Lee 2019 Lee and Zhang 2017 Mathonnat and Minea 2019 Murdie and Peksen 2015 Onuma et al 2017 Peksen 2011 Rontos et al 2015 Salahodjaev and Azam 2015 Wen and Chang 2015 Yanovskiy and Ginker 2017 Zhang and Posso 2017
-only distant factor	Carter and Palmer 2016 Dias and Tebaldi 2012 Flachaire et al. 2014 Knutsen 2015 Salahodjaev 2015 Tan and Tang 2018 Wong 2015 Xi 2017
-only a moderator	Ahmad 2017 Cavallo and Cavallo 2010 Easton et al. 2016 Edwards and Thames 2010 Kotera et al 2012 Neudorfer 2015 Neudorfer 2018 Outtara and Standaert 2020 Shin 2020 Sylwester 2015 Vadlamannati and Cooray 2017
Small country sample (<60)	Aas Rustad et al. 2011 Harding and Stasavage 2014 Iwasaki and Suzuki 2012 Pieters et al. 2016
Cross-sectional design	Boräng et al 2021 Fong and Leibrecht 2019 Kalenborn and Lessmann 2013 Khan and Shah 2019 Klomp and De Haan 2013 Kolstad and Wiig 2015 Mulligan et al 2010 Pellegata 2013 Povitkina and Bolkvadze 2019 Saha and Su 2012 Schmitt 2020 Serikbayeva et al 2020 Stier 2017 Whitford et al 2010 Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample

Outcome	<i>N</i> analyses	<i>N</i> countries (Mean)	<i>N</i> years (Mean)	<i>N</i> obs. (Mean)	Normative <i>t</i>-value (median)	Normative <i>t</i>-value (mean)	Negative Normative <i>t</i> < -1,96	Null Normative -1,96 < <i>t</i> > 1,96	Positive Normative <i>t</i> > 1,96
Economic Growth	19	138.0	77.1	4428.9	2.4	2.5	1	7	10
Inequality & Poverty	13	109.7	43.2	1516.7	1.9	1.4	1	6	6
Corruption	7	146.3	33.3	4221.0	3.1	0.8	1	2	4
Health	33	134.9	41.4	3281.2	2.7	6.4	1	6	20
Education	12	134.6	75.8	2404.1	2.3	1.7	0	4	5
Gender Equality	19	148.7	78.7	5427.6	4.3	8.3	1	6	10
Interstate Peace	9	N/A	71.4	335179.7	1.8	1.8	0	3	3
Intrastate Peace	8	164.4	75.8	6210.4	2.3	1.3	1	1	5
Full Sample	120	136.9	60.5	24515.4	2.4	4.0	6.0	35.0	63.0

References Table A1

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