2023, VOL. 30, NO. 5, 769–793
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2199452


FEATURE ARTICLE

### State of the world 2022: defiance in the face of autocratization*


Felix Wiebrecht, Yuko Sato, Marina Nord, Martin Lundstedt,
Fabio Angiolillo and Staffan I. Lindberg


Department of Political Science, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden


ARTICLE HISTORY Received 24 March 2023; Accepted 1 April 2023


KEYWORDS Democracy; autocracy; autocratization; democratic resilience; democratic resurgence; U-turn


Introduction


Based on this year’s release of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset version 13, [1]

we find that the third wave of autocratization [2] is reaching a new high in 2022. Core
components of democracy such as freedom of expression and the media, freedom of
association, and free and fair elections are all in decline across the world.


CONTACT Staffan I. Lindberg [sil@v-dem.net](mailto:sil@v-dem.net)
*The article draws on Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization from the V-Dem Institute
and has been reviewed by the co-editors-in-chief of Democratization before publication. Authors are listed in
reversed alphabetical order (except for Lindberg as the research team leader) to reflect the collective effort.
Equal authorship applies.


© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
[License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The
terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or
with their consent.


This article presents four primary findings. First, the global population-weighted
average of democracy measured by the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) [3] is back to
levels last seen in 1986. From the perspective of the average global citizen, democratic
gains made over the last 35 years have been undone in the last decade. Many countries
are better off today than in the mid-1980s but there are also those that are worse off,
and almost 72% of the world’s population now live in autocracies, an increase from
46% in 2012.
Second, the worldwide wave of autocratization is intensifying and reached a new
peak in 2022 with 42 autocratizing countries over the past decade, home to 43% of

’
the world s population. Meanwhile the 14 democratizing countries – a low not seen

’
since 1973 – harbour only 2% of the world s population. [4]

Third, autocracies are not only growing in numbers but also becoming more powerful economically. The share of world GDP generated by autocracies has been gradually
increasing during the last decades and is now at 46% when measured by purchasing
power parity, almost a doubling from 24% in 1992.
Fourth, and in defiance of the autocratization trend, we identify at least eight cases
where autocratization was not only stopped but also reversed into substantial regains
of democratic levels in the last 10 years: U-turns. Four of these cases (Slovenia, South
Korea, Ecuador, and Moldova) managed to halt autocratization and regain the democratic losses incurred before democracy broke down, whereas the other four (North
Macedonia, Bolivia, the Maldives, and Zambia) deteriorated into electoral autocracies
before initiating a significant reversal back to democracy. We offer a novel analysis that
identifies five elements that seem to have played important roles in the reversal across
many or all the cases and their various contexts: constraints on the executive by an
independent judiciary and sometimes the legislature, mass mobilization, alternation
in power, unified opposition coalescing with civil society, and international democracy
support and protection. Extending recent studies on democratic resilience, [5] the analysis of these eight U-turn cases illustrates that contemporary autocratization can be
stopped and reversed. The five elements identified by the analysis could be seen as
prime suspects for stopping and reversing contemporary autocratization, but their
causal impact would need to be corroborated in future research.
The first section below details the state of the world in 2022. This includes analysing
changes in the LDI and the Regimes of the World (RoW) [6] over time, as well as changes
in the sub-indices and indicators making up the LDI, along with a novel examination of
the share of world GDP across regime types. The second section focuses on democratization and autocratization, both in aggregate and with a focus on the top ten autocratizers and democratizers. In the third section, we introduce the eight U-turn cases and
document elements that seem to have influenced the reversals and democratic resurgence. We conclude by discussing possible new research avenues on regime change.


Rolling back democracy to 1986


Figure 1 displays the world average as well as regional average levels of democracy
based on the country averages (left panel) and the population-weighted averages
(right panel). Both panels show the “third wave of democratization” [7] peaking after
the end of the Cold War, followed by a decline over the past ten to fifteen years. In
2022, the level of liberal democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen deteriorated
to levels last seen in 1986, as shown by the black line in the right panel. The red line in


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0


World


Asia and the Pacific


Eastern Europe and Central Asia


Latin America and the Caribbean


Sub−Saharan Africa


The Middle East and North Africa


Western Europe and North America


1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022


1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022


Figure 1. Liberal Democracy Index by country averages and population-weighted averages, 1972–2022.


Notes: The black lines represent global averages on the LDI with the grey area marking the confidence intervals. The left panel is
based on conventional country averages. The right panel shows average levels of democracy weighted by population size.


the right panel traces the 2022 level of democracy back in time to show this. The left
panel – based on country averages – shows that the global average level of democracy is
back to the 1997-level. Since democracy is “rule by the people”, it arguably matters how
many people are enjoying democratic rights and freedoms around the world. The
population-weighted metric is therefore more indicative of the levels of democracy
experienced by people worldwide than straight country averages. A country-average
measure is also weighted – only giving equal weight to each government regardless
of the size of its territory or the number of people. Both panels in Figure 1 show
that the current wave of autocratization continues to deepen although substantial
gains made during the third wave of democratization remain.

Figure 1 also illustrates that the wave of autocratization spans all regions of the world,
with the Asia-Pacific region affected the greatest in the population-weighted measure,
not the least due to India’s steep decline on the LDI over the past ten years. The
degree of liberal democracy enjoyed by the average citizen in that region is down to
the 1978-level, even if a series of countries are much more democratic today than
during the late 1970s (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan).
Levels of democracy continue to deteriorate in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia
region, as well as in the Latin America and the Caribbean region and are now back to
the levels last seen around 1990 in the population-weighted measures, although many
countries are still better off today than 30 years ago – not the least in Eastern Europe.


Evenly divided between regimes but 72% of population in autocracies


Figure 2 shows the continuing autocratization using the Regimes of the World (RoW)
classification. RoW uses the same indicators that form the LDI to divide countries into
four distinct regime types: closed autocracies, electoral autocracies, electoral democracies,
and liberal democracies. [8] The left panel depicts the number of countries, while the right
panel presents the share of the world’s population by regime type, over the last five decades.


100


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|52%|||||
||||||
||||||
|||||45%|
|||||~~44%~~|
||||||
||||~~39~~|~~%~~|
||||||
||||||
|||||28%|
||||||
||||||
|~~19%~~|||||
|~~17%~~||18%|||
|||||~~16%~~<br>13%|
|~~12%~~|||||
||||||
||||||
||||||
||||||
||||||


1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022


90


80


70


60


50


40


30


20


10


0


|Col1|Col2|
|---|---|
|||
|||
|86<br>87||
|||
|||
|||
||65|
||59<br>~~58~~|
||~~56~~|
||44|
|||
|36||
||~~33~~|
||~~32~~|
|20||
|16||
|||
|||
|||
|||


1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022


55%


50%


45%


40%


35%


30%


25%


20%


15%


10%


5%


0%


Closed Autocracy


Electoral Autocracy


Electoral Democracy


Liberal Democracy


Figure 2. Regime types by number of countries and share of population, 1972–2022.


Notes: Figure 2 plots the number of countries (left panel) and the share of the world’s population (right panel) by regime type.
Some uncertainty remains about regimes that exhibit similar degrees of authoritarian and democratic traits and thus are close to
the threshold between democracy and autocracy. In 2022, uncertainty about countries scoring applied to 16 countries (notably,
India is not among the 16 countries; it is unambiguously classified as an electoral autocracy since 2019). Thus, the number of

                                                                                   autocracies in the world might range from 84 to 100 countries, with 89 being our best estimate based on the main RoW classifi
cation used for Figure 2.


According to the RoW classification, the world is almost evenly divided between 90
democracies and 89 autocracies at the end of 2022. Yet, closed and electoral autocracies
together contain almost 72% of the world’s population, or 5.7 billion people (including

’
India s 1.4 billion) – up from 46% only ten years ago. [9]

The number of liberal democracies declined from its peak of 44 in 2009 to 32
countries in 2022, with 13% of the world’s population. Although electoral democracies
were on the rise during the last years and count the highest in absolute number with 58
countries in 2022, they are home to only 16% of the world’s population. Notably, the
recent rise of electoral democracies is largely due to liberal democracies undergoing
autocratization rather than electoral autocracies democratizing.
By contrast, the number of closed autocracies increased from 22 in 2012 to 33
countries in 2022 and accounts for almost 28% of the world’s population. Meanwhile,
electoral autocracies remain the world’s most populous regime type, hosting 44% of
the world’s population, or 3.5 billion people.


Large regional differences


Democratic rights and freedoms are distributed unequally across citizens in the regions
of the world, as depicted in Figure 3. The most autocratic region is the Middle East and
North Africa with 98% of the population residing in autocracies, and the remaining 2%
living in Israel, which in early 2023 shows distinct signs of autocratization. AsiaPacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe–Central Asia remain predominantly
autocratic, with 89%, 79%, and 73% of these regions’ populations living in autocracies,
respectively. In Latin America and the Caribbean there is a predominance of electoral


Eastern Europe, Central Asia


Western Europe, North America


Latin American, Caribbean


Sub−Saharan Africa


Asia, Pacific


Middle East, North Africa


Closed Autocracies Electoral Autocracies Electoral Democracies Liberal Democracies


Figure 3. Regional shares of population by regime type, 2022.


democracy, hosting 83% of the region’s population. In Western Europe and North
America, 92% of the population live in liberal democracies.


Drastic changes in the last decade


Figure 4 shows that most aspects of democracy have been negatively affected since
2012 compared to 2022. It displays the component-indices of the liberal, electoral,


36


32


28


24


20


16


12


8


4


36


32


28


24


20


16


12


8


4


0


2022


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|2012|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||C|lean Elec|tions||||||||
|||Elected|Officials||||||||
|Freed<br>|om of<br>Delibe|Associati<br>ration|onFree|d**om o**f E|xpressio|n|||||
||Ju|dical Con|**stra**ints||||||||
|Rule|of Law<br>L|**gis**lative|Constrai|ts|||||||
|~~Suffra~~|~~ge~~<br>||||||||||
||||||||||||


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||||||||
||||||C|lean Elect|ions||||
||||||||Freedom|of Expre|ssion||
|Ju|dical Cons|trai**nts**|Elected O|fficials F|reedo|m of Ass|ociation|Del|iberatio|n|
|||Legisla|tive Constr|aints|Rul|e of Law|||||
|~~**S**~~|~~ffrage~~||||||||||


0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36
Number of Countries Declining


0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36
Number of Countries Declining


Deliberative Component Electoral Democracy Liberal Component


Figure 4. Democratic aspects improving and declining, 2012 and 2022.


Notes: For indices measuring components of democracy, Figure 4 shows the number of countries improving and declining significantly (i.e. the confidence intervals do not overlap) and substantially (i.e. the difference is greater than 0.05). The left panel
compares changes between 2012 and 2002, and the right panel compares changes between 2022 and 2012.


and deliberative democracy indices. [10] The left panel demonstrates that more countries
were improving, rather than declining, in every aspect of democracy in 2012. By 2022,
there were more countries declining rather than improving in nearly all democratic
aspects captured by the V-Dem liberal, electoral, and deliberative democracy indices
(right panel).
As shown in the right panel of Figure 4, freedom of expression was the component of democracy in most decline, significantly worsening in 35 countries
between 2012 and 2022, while improving in only 11. In comparison, the left
panel shows that by 2012 there were only 7 countries in which this index had
declined over the last ten years while in 14 it had improved. The deliberative component is the next worst affected, with substantial deteriorations in 32 countries in
2022, compared to 1 in 2012. The quality of elections and the rule of law also deteriorated in 23 and 19 countries, respectively, in contrast to 8 and 2 in 2012. For
freedom of association, there were three times more countries declining (17)
than advancing (5) by 2022.

Figure 5 details which specific indicators of components declined in the largest
number of countries between 2012 and 2022. Government censorship of the media
got worse in 47 countries, harassment of journalists increased in 36 countries, and
freedom of expression for women declined in 34 countries. Civil society was also


Government censorship effort −−− Media


Range of consultation


CSO entry and exit


Engaged society


Freedom of academic and cultural expression


Respect counterarguments


CSO repression


Harassment of journalists


Freedom of discussion for women


Media bias


Freedom of discussion for men


Reasoned justification


Media self−censorship


Election free and fair


Transparent laws with predictable enforcement


Print/broadcast media critical


Freedom of foreign movement


Executive oversight


Rigorous and impartial public administration


Print/broadcast media perspectives


45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0


Clean Elections Deliberative Component Freedom of Association Freedom of Expression Liberal Component


Figure 5. Top-20 declining indicators, 2012–2022.


Notes: Figure 5 plots the 20 indicators that decline significantly (i.e. the confidence intervals do not overlap) and substantially (i.e.
the 2022 value is at least 0.5 points lower than the 2012 value) in the most countries between 2012 and 2022.


under increasing pressure: the right to exist for civil society organizations (CSOs)
declined in 40 countries, while repression of CSOs increased in 37 countries. More
than 30 countries experienced substantial deterioration in the range of consultation
by the government, the extent to which society is engaged in deliberation on policy,
the level of respect for counterarguments, and the extent to which the government provides reasoned justification for their actions. Notably, there are many more countries
that register declines on individual indicators than on the indices discussed above. This
analysis thus hints at what aspects of democracy are often undermined first when
countries start to autocratize.


Autocracies account for a rising share of the world economy


Figure 6 shows that autocracies not only increased in numbers and in the share of the
world’s population during the last decades but also became more powerful economically. By the end of the Cold War, democracies economically dominated the world,
accounting for over 75% of global GDP/ppp. [11] The Soviet Union – at the time the
most economically powerful autocracy of the world – represented slightly above
10% of the world’s economy, while China accounted for about 4%. The remaining
autocracies were barely visible statistically.
By 2022, closed autocracies alone generated 25% of global GDP/ppp, while another
21% was attributable to electoral autocracies. Thus, autocracies combined account for
46% of world GDP/ppp, almost a doubling from 24% in 1992.
The change is driven by both economic and political transformations. Of course, it
in part reflects China’s economic rise. Its share of world GDP/ppp increased from
4.4% in 1992 to 18.5% in 2022. Yet, some other autocracies were also growing fast
due to demographic trends and their “catching up” in terms of economic productivity. Among closed autocracies, Vietnam almost quadrupled its share of
world GDP/ppp over the last 30 years, while Qatar more than doubled its share of
global GDP/ppp. In addition, electoral autocracies, including Angola, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan, also substantially increased their share of the global

economy.
The continuing third wave of autocratization further accelerated this trend.
India, which recently transitioned into an electoral autocracy, more than
doubled its share of the global economy from 1992 and now accounts for 7.2%
of global GDP/ppp. Türkiye (another country that turned from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy over the same period) increased its share from 1.3%
in 1992 to 2.1% in 2022.


100%


75%


56%


50%


20%


25%


12%


12%


0%


39%


15%


21%


25%


1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022


Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy Electoral Autocracy Closed Autocracy


Figure 6. Share of world GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity) by regime type, 1992–2022.


Notes: The data on GDP/ppp come from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (the International Monetary Fund).


Democratizers and autocratizers


Figure 7 details patterns of democratization and autocratization over the last five
decades. The left panel shows the number of countries in each category, while the
right panel depicts their share of the world’s population. The number of democratizing
countries declined from a peak of 71 with 29% of the world’s population in 1999 to 14
democratizing countries in 2022 – a low not seen since 1973. Notably, the 14 democratizing countries are small in population terms, with only 2% of the world’s population.
2022 registered a new record of 42 autocratizing countries, home to 43% of the
world’s population. The upwards curve is indeed very steep over the last five years indicating an escalation of the autocratization wave.
It is notable that many of the world’s autocratizing countries are significant regional
and global powers. Russia’s direct influence on the democratic aspirations in many of
the former Soviet Republics, its invasion of Ukraine, and its weaponization of fossil
fuel exports exemplify potential security implications resulting from autocratization.
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Türkiye, and the United States of America are other populous,
powerful, influential states among autocratizers over the past ten years.


70


60


50


40


30


20


10


0


|Col1|71|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|||||
|||||
|||||
|||||
|||||
||||~~42~~|
|||||
|||||
|~~28~~||||
|||||
|17|||~~14~~|
|||||
|||||
|||||


1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022


|Col1|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|||43%|
||||
||~~29%~~||
||||
||||
||||
|10%|||
||||
|~~4%~~||2%|
||||


1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 2022


40%


30%


20%


10%


0%


Autocratizing Countries Democratizing Countries


Figure 7. Autocratizing and democratizing countries, 1972–2022.


Notes: There is some uncertainty about the exact number of autocratizing and democratizing countries each year. In 2022, 8
countries were identified as borderline cases. The number of autocratizers could therefore range from 38 to 44, with 42
being our best estimate; and the number of democratizers could range from 14 to 16. See endnote 4 for details.


Major autocratizers


Figure 8 shows the top ten autocratizing countries over the last ten- and three-year
periods, based on the magnitude of change. [12] Democracy broke down in seven of
the top ten autocratizing countries between 2012 and 2022 (left panel): El Salvador,
Hungary, India, Serbia, Thailand, Tunisia, and Türkiye. Only three out of ten countries
remained democracies in 2022: Brazil, Mauritius, and Poland. This indicates that
almost 80% of democracies undergoing autocratization eventually lose their democratic status. [13] Thus, the statistical probability that democracy will survive if a democratic country enters a period of autocratization, is very low.
Notably, democracy also broke down in five out of ten countries in the shorter
three-year perspective (right panel): Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
and Tunisia.
Three countries – El Salvador, Mauritius, and Tunisia – appear as top autocratizers
in both panels in Figure 8. In Tunisia, the recent autocratization episode was substantial enough to be among the top ten even in the ten-year window. In El Salvador and
Mauritius, the process of autocratization started some time ago but continued to a significant degree also in the last three years.
In seven out of ten countries in the ten-year perspective, the process of autocratization appears to have stalled or slowed down significantly. Two notable examples of this
are Brazil and Poland, both of which halted the autocratization trend before democracy
collapsed. The 2022 presidential election in Brazil led to the democratic removal of Jair
Bolsonaro from office. In Poland, internal forces organized against autocratization,
contemporaneous to the European Union pushing back on executive actions against


10 years


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||Braz|il|
||||||||
||||||Polan|d|
||||||Mauriti|us|
||||||~~Hunga~~<br>~~Indi~~|~~ry~~<br>|
||||||Serbi|a|
||||||Tunisi|a|
||||||Thaila|nd|
||||||~~El Salv~~<br>Turke|~~dor~~<br>y|
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||


2012 2017 2022


3 years

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||~~Gre~~|~~ece~~|
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||~~Arm~~<br>|~~enia~~<br>|
|||||||||Mau|ritius|
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||~~urkin~~<br>~~Tun~~|~~a Faso~~<br>~~isia~~|
|||||||||M|ali|
||||||||G|uinea|−Bissau|
|||||||||~~El Sa~~|~~vador~~|
|||||||||Afgha<br>~~Mya~~|nistan<br>~~mar~~|
|||||||||||


2019 2020 2021 2022


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0


Closed Autocracy Electoral Autocracy Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy


Figure 8. Top 10 autocratizing countries (10 years vs. 3 years).


Notes: Figure 8 plots values of the LDI for the 10 countries with the greatest decreases in the last 10 years (left panel) and 3 years
(right panel).


the judiciary. Slowing down or stalling of autocratization is also noticeable in Hungary,
India, Serbia, Thailand, and Türkiye, although the last three countries are at a very low
level on the LDI and the extent to which further deterioration is possible was therefore
limited.
Afghanistan, Armenia, Burkina Faso, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Myanmar
are recent autocratizers and thus appear as top autocratizers only in the right panel
of Figure 8. In Armenia and Greece, the governments severely restrict press
freedom and regularly prevent journalists from reporting on a number of issues.
Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Myanmar suffered from serious human rights
violations following the Taliban takeover and military coups.
It is notable that autocratization often goes beyond a deterioration of the quality of
democracy in existing democracies, including Brazil, Greece, Poland, and the United
States, and beyond a transition from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy in El
Salvador, Hungary, and India. It also affects even already autocratic countries, such
as Myanmar and Russia, which have become more repressively overt with a denial
of even basic human rights.
Focusing on specific indicators of democracy that make up the indices above, we
note further details about autocratization in Figure 9. It shows that media censorship,
repression of civil society, and academic freedom are the most frequent central focus of
attacks by autocrats. These measures declined in over 25 autocratizing countries over

                                                the last decade. For example, government censorship of the media worsened signifi
cantly during this period in Afghanistan, El Salvador, Hong Kong, Mauritius, and
Poland. Freedom of academic and cultural expression was severely weakened in Indonesia, Russia, and Uruguay, among many others. There were also significant


Government censorship effort −−− Media


CSO repression


Freedom of academic and cultural expression


CSO entry and exit


Freedom of discussion for women


Range of consultation


Freedom of discussion for men


Engaged society


Transparent laws with predictable enforcement


Respect counterarguments


Election free and fair


Print/broadcast media critical


Media bias


Harassment of journalists


EMB autonomy


Rigorous and impartial public administration


Media self−censorship


Executive respects constitution


Executive oversight


Election government intimidation


25 20 15 10 5 0

Number of Autocratizing Countries Declining


Clean Elections Deliberative Component Freedom of Association Freedom of Expression Liberal Component


Figure 9. Top-20 declining indicators in autocratizing countries, 2012–2022.


Notes: Figure 9 plots the number of autocratizing countries declining significantly and substantially on the top 20 indicators. The
red line marks the top 10 indicators. An indicator is declining substantially and significantly if its 2022 value is at least 0.5 points
lower than its 2012 value on a scale ranging from 0 to 4 (for most variables) or 0 to 5 (for some variables), and the confidence
intervals do not overlap.


deteriorations in the indicators for freedom of discussion for men and women, which
declined in 22 and 24 countries, respectively. Two key indicators of deliberative
democracy declined in 22 autocratizing countries. In Burundi, Myanmar, and
Serbia, for instance, the range of actors invited to deliberate on policy changes declined
significantly.


Major democratizers


Figure 10 shows the top ten democratizing countries over the last ten- and three-year
periods -countries that are defying the wave of autocratization. Eight out of the top ten
democratizing countries in the last ten years (left panel) were autocracies in 2012. Only
Georgia and Ecuador were democracies and have continued to improve further over
the last ten years. By 2022 the situation is reversed: eight out of these ten are democracies. The Seychelles made a transition from electoral autocracy to liberal democracy
and continues its upward trajectory. Armenia, The Gambia, Honduras, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka progressed from the status of electoral autocracies to electoral democracies. Fiji


10 years


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0


3 years


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||Seyche|lles|
||||||||
||||||Georg<br>|ia<br>|
||||||~~Ecuad~~<br>~~Nepa~~|~~or~~<br>~~l~~|
||||||Gamb|ia|
||||||Armen<br><br>|ia<br><br>|
||||||~~Hondu~~<br>~~Sri Lan~~|~~as~~<br>~~ka~~|
||||||||
||||||Fiji<br>||
||||||~~Madaga~~|~~scar~~|
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||
||||||||


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
||||||||C|zech|epublic|
|||||||||||
|||||||||Seyc|helles|
|||||||||~~Bul~~<br>~~Mol~~|~~aria~~<br>~~dova~~|
|||||||||||
|||||||||~~Mal~~<br>~~Ga~~|~~awi~~<br>~~bia~~|
||||||||Dom|inica<br>|Republic<br>|
|||||||||Zam|bia|
|||||||||~~Hon~~|~~uras~~|
|||||||||~~Bol~~|~~ivia~~|
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||
|||||||||||


2012 2017 2022


2019 2020 2021 2022


Closed Autocracy Electoral Autocracy Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy


Figure 10. Top 10 democratizing countries (10 years vs. 3 years).


Notes: Figure 10 plots values of the LDI for the 10 countries with the greatest increases in the last 10 years (left panel) and 3 years
(right panel).


and Madagascar improved substantially and significantly on the LDI but remain electoral autocracies.
The right panel of Figure 10 focuses on the shorter three-year perspective. Notably,
seven out of the top ten democratizers in the last three years are new: Bolivia, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Malawi, Moldova, and Zambia. Four out
of the ten transitioned from electoral autocracy to electoral democracy in the last three
years: Bolivia, Honduras, Malawi, and Zambia.
Nonetheless, most of the current democratizers are countries with small populations and limited global influence. This fact notwithstanding, there is some evidence
that some European countries are now moving in a democratic direction: Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, and Moldova are among the top ten democratizing countries in the
last three years. Second, with transitions back to electoral democracy in two cases
and one U-turn before democratic breakdown, Bolivia, Moldova, and Zambia joined
an exclusive group of democracies showing defiance in the face of the global wave
of autocratization. Below, we discuss eight cases of such democratic resurgence.


U-turns: at least eight democracies bouncing back [14]


During the last decade, there were at least eight autocratizing countries that successfully halted autocratization and reversed the process: Bolivia, Ecuador, the Maldives,
Moldova, North Macedonia, Slovenia, South Korea, and Zambia. [15] These countries

                                                were democracies at some point in the last twenty years, registered a period of signifi
cant and substantial autocratization that was halted and was followed by a period of
significant and substantial democratization at some point in the last ten years


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1

|Bolivia|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Ecuador|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Maldives|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32|Col33|Col34|Col35|Moldova|Col37|Col38|Col39|Col40|Col41|Col42|Col43|Col44|Col45|Col46|Col47|Col48|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||


2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022


Closed Autocracy Electoral Autocracy Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy


Figure 11. U-turns: Countries that halted autocratization and reverted to democracy, 2002–2022.


Notes: Figure 11 plots countries that were democracies at some point in the last 20 years, registered a period of significant and
substantial autocratization that was halted and was followed by a period of significant and substantial democratization in the
last 10 years largely restoring the level of democracy, and they remain democracies as of 2022.


largely restoring the level of democracy, and they remain democracies as of 2022. [16]

Figure 11 renders the trajectories of the eight U-turn countries.
These U-turn cases arguably have unique potential in suggesting how current autocratization processes can be reversed. Our analysis is not definitive but at a minimum is
suggestive about which elements may help both to stop autocratization and reverse it.
Though generalizability may be limited, [17] we identify patterns across these eight most
recent U-turns which point to new possible streams of research to systematically study
democratic resurgence amid contemporary autocratization, its causes over time, and
consequences for democratic resilience.
While all these countries lack “onset resilience”, Ecuador, Moldova, Slovenia, and
South Korea show “breakdown resilience” (i.e. the ability to avert democratic breakdown once an autocratization episode has started). [18] In the four remaining countries,
democracy broke down before being re-instated. The cases reveal that there is a third
type of resilience unanticipated by Boese et al., where autocratization leads to breakdown
but pro-democratic elements still endeavour to successfully bring democracy back
within a short time. Notably, in all the eight countries democratic procedures and institutions were undermined gradually, albeit at different paces and to varying degrees.
Moreover, these eight countries are scattered over four world regions, have very
different levels of socio-economic development, types of dominating religion, degrees
of statehood, and differ substantially in their initial levels of democracy. These cases
can potentially highlight broader lessons about how to halt and reverse autocratization.
In many of the U-turn countries, anti-pluralist leaders and parties drove autocratization. [19] Until 2019, during the tenure of President Evo Morales, Bolivia was on a slow
path of autocratization. In Ecuador, institutions were severely undermined under


President Rafael Correa’s leadership (2007–2017) but the most recent 2021 presidential
elections were largely seen as free and fair, enabling a peaceful transfer of power. The
Maldives autocratized substantially under the rule of President Abdulla Yameen in
power from 2013. Similarly, North Macedonia began to autocratize in 2007 under
Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. Starting in 2020, former Prime Minister Janez
Janša in Slovenia seemed to mimic Hungary’s Viktor Orbán by undermining press
freedoms. [20] After its change of government, however, Slovenia regained democratic
freedoms and became the first east European country to recognize same-sex marriage.
Although South Korea remained a liberal democracy over the last 20 years, it went
through an episode of autocratization between 2008 and 2016 that intensified under
President Park Geun-hye’s tenure from 2013 to 2017. Zambia’s autocratization
began with the electoral success of former President Edgar Lungu from the Patriotic
Front (PF) in 2014. Only Moldova lacked a single autocratizing leader and deterioration was instead the product of widespread corruption and oligarchic control over
politics. [21] Zambia also exemplifies that in the breakdown cases, substantial improvements followed re-democratization such as the 2022 court ruling that the closure of
the major Zambian newspaper The Post was illegal, signaling an improved media
environment. [22]

Below we elaborate on five elements that seem critical in the eight U-turn cases:
executive constraints, mass mobilization, alternation in power, unified opposition coalescing with civil society, and international democracy support and protection. We show
that there are substantial commonalities, although alternation in power is the only
element present in all cases. Moreover, we demonstrate that combinations of elements
seem to have mattered in all countries, rather than a single development or event.


Executive constraints


’
Research suggests that executives power concentration – sometimes called “executive
aggrandizement” [23] or weakening of horizontal accountability [24] – is one of the main
threats to democracy. [25] Elected officials weaken checks on executive power through a
series of institutional changes that undermine the possibilities to constrain the executive.
Halting or resisting autocratizers’ attempts to wield unconstrained power include independent controls by the judiciary and other independent institutions, and legislative oversight.

Figure 12 below highlights that aspiring autocrats were confronted with different
levels of judicial and legislative constraints that may have ramifications on how successfully they could drive autocratization. We find that the strength of executive constraints seems to have been critical in enabling a turn-around in cases with high initial
levels of democracy. In South Korea, for instance, public prosecutors were able to
expose that President Park was engaged in corruption, ultimately leading to the legislature impeaching her, with the constitutional court subsequently upholding the conviction. [26] In Slovenia, the opposition made active use of parliamentary statutes to hold
the executive accountable and in 2020, members of parliament posed a total of 1,857
questions to the government and ministers, all of which had to be answered. [27]

Although several independent supervisory bodies such as the Court of Audit were
under immense political pressure, the Janša government was ultimately not able to
subsume it under political interests. [28]

Executive constraints also played a critical role in some countries with lower levels
of democracy. In North Macedonia, the constitutional court in 2016 suspended


1.0


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0


1.0


0.9


0.8


0.7


0.6


0.5


0.4


0.3


0.2


0.1


0.0

|Bolivia|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Ecuador|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Maldives|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32|Moldova|Col34|Col35|Col36|Col37|Col38|Col39|Col40|Col41|Col42|Col43|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||


2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022


Judicial Constraints Legislative Constraints


Figure 12. Executive constraints in eight U-turn cases, 2002–2022.


Notes: The y-axis exhibits the scores of the indices for the judicial and legislative constraints. High scores indicate high levels of
constraints on the executive. The vertical line shows the timing of a critical turnover of the head of government and/or the head
of state.


elections that would have seen a full-blown victory for the government after the opposition announced a boycott. [29] The re-scheduled elections resulted in the overthrow of
Gruevski’s government and marked a turn-around. In Ecuador, the term limit that
Correa abolished with the approval of the legislature and the Constitutional Court
as part of his weakening of independent checks on the executive, ironically led to
his downfall. Since it should have been phased out from 2021, Correa planned to transfer power to his ally and Vice-President Lenin Moreno for the 2017 Presidential elections. Yet, Moreno defected from the autocratizing path and reversed many of Correa’s
decisions and policies, highlighting the importance of term limits and elite splits in
ruling coalitions. [30]

A strong and independent judiciary can also be instrumental. In Moldova, the Party
of Action and Solidarity (PAS) controlled the presidency in 2021, while the legislature
was still under oligarchic influence. After a failure to form a new government, the constitutional court ruled that snap elections should be held. Believing that this would lead
to massive gains for PAS in the legislature, parliament attempted to block the elections
by initiating a Covid-19 state of emergency and by replacing one of the judges of the
constitutional court. [31] Both actions were deemed unconstitutional and ultimately
failed. With the court ruling and following the elections, Moldova continued its democratic progress.
Finally, in three countries executive constraints played a minor role perhaps since
institutions and constraints had already been severely eroded in the process of autocratization. [32] In the Maldives, President Yameen faced a political crisis when the supreme
court in 2018 overruled terrorism convictions against members of parliament and previous President Mohammed Nasheen, and reinstated 12 members of the parliament that


would enable parliament to impeach the president. In response, Yameen called for a state
of emergency, sent troops to parliament, and arrested two justices of the supreme
court. [33] The president was ousted in the presidential election later the same year and
opposition leader Ibrahim Soli won. In Bolivia, the electoral management body was
unwilling or unable to thoroughly investigate allegations of electoral fraud. Instead, Bolivia’s return to democracy was marked by mass mobilization, splits within the ruling elite,
and Morales’ loss of the army’s support. Zambia’s return to democracy was rooted in a
robust and dense network of civil society actors organizing mobilization for democracy
and actively resisting Lungu’s attempts for constitutional amendments. This resulted in
electoral victory of the opposition leader from the United Party for National Development (UPND), Hakainde Hichilema, in 2021. [34]


Mass mobilization


Mobilization is another element seen in many of the U-turn countries, often discussed
in the literature on democratic resilience. [35] On the one hand, mobilization for democracy is typically important for democratization. [36] Political pressure from below may
create an opportunity for the democratic opposition to win elections, [37] and to
prevent the ruling party from implementing further autocratic reforms. [38] Thus, we
may expect that mass mobilization can play a critical role in halting and reverting autocratization. On the other hand, authoritarian-leaning governments also mobilize
support to shield themselves [39] and to demonstrate their popularity and legitimacy. [40]

Figure 13 displays the patterns of mobilization for democracy and for autocracy in
the U-turn cases. Mobilization for democracy tends to be especially high in proximity
to critical turnovers of the heads of government and/or heads of state. In most of the


4


3


2


1


0


4


3


2


1


0

|Bolivia|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Ecuador|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Maldives|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32|Moldova|Col34|Col35|Col36|Col37|Col38|Col39|Col40|Col41|Col42|Col43|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|North Macedonia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|Slovenia|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|South Korea|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|Zambia|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||


2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022


Mobilization for Autocracy Mobilization for Democracy


Figure 13. Mobilizations for democracy and autocracy in U-turn cases, 2002–2022.


Notes: The y-axis exhibits the scores of the mobilization indicators. High scores indicate high levels of mobilization. The vertical
line shows the timing of a critical turnover of the head of government and/or the head of state.


cases, mass mobilization was triggered by a critical event, such as corruption scandals
in Moldova and South Korea, or anti-democratic reforms or attempts at them, for
example in the Maldives and North Macedonia. This aligns with previous research:
once rulers initiate policy initiatives and reforms that undermine democracy, opposition groups mobilize to defend democratic norms. [41] In Slovenia, for instance, massive
anti-government protests occurred in 2021 following civil society’s mobilization to
oppose Janza’s autocratizing reforms. [42] In the Maldives, opposition groups protested
intensively in 2018 against President Yameen. [43] In North Macedonia, autocratization
initiated by Prime Minister Gruevski prompted the opposition to coordinate massive
protests a year prior to the 2016 elections. [44] These examples suggest that civil society
played an influential role in reversing autocratization.
Some of the cases exhibit the importance of long-term mobilization against an autocratizing government. In Bolivia, for example, the opposition movement and popular
mobilization against Morales grew over time. After Bolivia’s constitutional court
annulled the results of a referendum, in which 51 percent of Bolivians had rejected
a constitutional draft that would have allowed Morales to seek another term, nationwide protests erupted. Protesters in the streets, united under the slogans of “February
21” and “No means no”, questioned the legitimacy of the court by casting null votes in
2017 judicial elections. These movements served as platforms for the 2019 electoral
protests, putting immense pressure on Morales to resign. [45] Such sustainable resistance
may also be a key for democratic resurgence.
In addition to strong mobilization for democracy, most of the cases discussed here
show relatively low levels of mobilization for autocracy throughout the autocratization
episodes (Figure 13). The absence of strong mobilization for autocracy should make it
easier for a democratic opposition to oust a regime and may be an important factor
facilitating democratic resurgence. In Bolivia, the Maldives, North Macedonia, South
Korea, and Zambia, levels of mobilization for autocracy increased significantly at
some point but remained below the levels of mobilization for democracy most of
the time.
Mobilization for autocracy can nonetheless be a significant feature of autocratization episodes. [46] In the eight cases analysed here, mobilization typically increases
towards the end of autocratizing leaders’ tenure. Some rally their supporters more
intensively to exhibit legitimacy, including in Bolivia, the Maldives, South Korea,
and Zambia. In South Korea, many of President Park’s supporters took part in antiimpeachment rallies in response to protests directed at the president in 2016. [47] In
Bolivia, Morales’s supporters counter-reacted mass mobilization after the 2019 presidential election, leading to street clashes between pro- and anti-government protesters. [48] Mobilization for autocracy raises questions about the long-term democratic
stability in these countries.


Government turnover, democratic opposition, and international support for
democracy


While executive constraints and mass mobilization are common elements in most or
all of our U-turn cases, our analysis also points to additional elements. Aspects that
seem to have influenced the reversal in several of the cases include: removal of autocratizing leaders, successful opposition unity and effective strategies, and international
democracy support and protection.


Removing autocratizing leaders and parties from power is a critical aspect of reversing autocratization. Elections are a natural tool for replacing incumbents but one that
may not always be possible once autocratization has taken hold. Elections seem to have
played an important role in at least five of the eight cases: the Maldives, Moldova,
North Macedonia, Slovenia, and Zambia. Elections led to a majority for pro-democratic parties, removing autocratizing incumbents, crucial for initiating or continuing
renewed democratization. Notably, elections not only played this role in countries that
were still democratic – Moldova and Slovenia – but in three countries where democracy had already broken down. The removals of President Yameen in the Maldives,
Prime Minister Gruevski in North Macedonia, and President Lungu in Zambia happened through elections in an autocratic context favouring the incumbents. In line
with some of the earlier literature, this points to the importance of elections in the
democratization of autocracies. [49]

In three additional cases, U-turns were facilitated by other critical events filling as
similar function. In South Korea, Park was ousted by impeachment. In Ecuador,
Correa was replaced by his vice-president Moreno due to term-limits, with Moreno
subsequently abandoning Correa’s autocratizing project. In Bolivia, Morales resigned
as the outcome of multiple pressures toward his unpopular rule. Thus, while elections
may serve as important focal points around which opposition may unite to oust autocratizing leaders, these cases demonstrate that this is not the only viable path to remove
autocratizing incumbents. The seemingly critical role of removing anti-pluralist
leaders to stop and turn autocratization around, corroborate recent findings
showing the central role of anti-pluralist leaders in contemporary autocratization
processes. [50]

A unified opposition coalescing with civil society pursuing peaceful, legal strategies also seems to have been important in seven of the U-turn cases. For
example, in Zambia, civil society groups, including the Zambian Conference of
Catholic Bishops and the Council of Churches of Zambia, advanced peaceful mass
mobilization for democracy which resulted in opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema’s electoral victory in 2021. [51] In Moldova, an embezzlement scandal exposed the
extensive political corruption in 2014, which led to widespread protests during
2015–2016. [52] Opposition parties, including the PAS, grew by capturing popular discontent during this protest. [53] Similarly in Slovenia, civil society and non-governmental organizations joined forces in the fight against Janza’s rule. Galvanizing growing
public discontent, mobilization for democracy helped Robert Golob come to power
in 2022. [54]

Not unexpectedly, there is an overlap between countries where a unified opposition
coalesced with civil society and instances where incumbents were replaced through
elections. Yet, also in South Korea broad segments of a largely unified opposition
and civil society coalesced and mounted pressure for impeachment, demonstrating
the wider potential of coalition-building in ousting autocratizers. Thus, in seven of
the eight cases, coalescing different pro-democratic actors and creating a joint resistance to autocratization seem to have been important elements for halting and reversing
autocratization. This conclusion also aligns with previous findings. [55]

The strategies adopted by opposition actors also seem important. The cases of
Bolivia and Ecuador show that peaceful protests and challenging the incumbent government through parliamentary and legal means, can keep the door open for government turnover and democratic resurgence. This finding echoes those in recent research


pointing towards the dangers of irregular attempts to remove incumbents from
office. [56] Unlawful actions may backfire and rather embolden leaders with autocratic
tendencies to clamp down harder on opposition and civil society. Türkiye and Venezuela are illustrations of this. [57]

Finally, international democracy support and protection can contribute to halting
and reversing autocratization, a factor also suggested elsewhere. [58] In at least five of
our featured cases, it seems that international democracy promotion efforts were
important: Bolivia, Ecuador, North Macedonia, Slovenia, and Zambia. In Ecuador,
for example, some media corporations and civil society organizations appealed
against domestic legal decisions to international institutions, including the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. The European Union put pressure on autocratizers in Slovenia, while facilitating negotiations between polarized political parties
in North Macedonia. These examples possibly point to good news for the international
support and protection community, and to a need to study this aspect of the processes
in more depth.


Summary of the findings from the eight U-turn cases and looking forward


Table 1 summarizes the analysis of the five elements that seem to be important in
halting and reversing autocratization in the eight U-turn cases. While alternation of
power cuts across all cases, perhaps the most important conclusion is that no single
factor alone was decisive, with several working in tandem. Similar to Lührmann and
Laebens, we find that different combinations were important in different settings. [59]

In South Korea, for instance, the legislature and judiciary responded only when
popular pressure was too great to ignore. In North Macedonia, international efforts
to organize negotiations enabled elections that were ultimately responsible for the
ousting of Gruevski. In the Maldives, Slovenia, and Zambia, widespread mobilization
for democracy ahead of elections ensured a substantial opposition turnout and
support, tipping the electoral scales in favour of the democratic opposition. These
are but a few examples of how combinations of elements contributed to removing
autocratizers from power and putting countries back on a democratic path.
The analysis here of eight U-turns should be informative of how contemporary autocratization can be halted and reversed, but causal impact of the factors need to be corroborated in further research. The descriptive analysis can be read as providing


Table 1. Five important elements across the U-turn cases.


Executive Alternation Unified International
Mass mobilization
Country constraints in power opposition support
Presence of Absence of

mobilization mobilization
for democracy for autocracy


Bolivia X X X X

Ecuador X X X X X

Maldives X X

Moldova X X X X X

North Macedonia X X X X X

Slovenia X X X X X X

South Korea X X X X

Zambia X X X X

Note: “X” marks the presence of this element in the cases.


insights on potential causal factors that can guide future scholarship on understanding
both U-turns and why autocratization in other cases resulted in entrenched autocratic
rule. Our first attempt at understanding how these countries managed to reverse autocratization can serve as a useful starting point for assessing determinants of continued
autocratization and reversals.
Finally, can we be optimistic that countries experiencing U-turns will not revert to
autocratization? We do not know. One observation may shed some light on the question: demobilization seems central. While most of the eight cases register a sharp
decline in mobilization after the restoration of democracy, mobilization against the
democratic government in Moldova has intensified since 2022. [60] Violent protests
also erupted in Bolivia when an anti-Morales opposition leader, Luis Fernando
Camacho, was arrested in 2022. [61] Democratic long-term stability may face significant
challenges in these two cases. [62] Thus, reducing mobilization for autocracy may be one
key ingredient for further democratic stability of the country reversing autocratization,
something that other studies have also pointed to. [63]


Conclusion


This article documents a deepening of the third wave of autocratization. The global
average of the LDI is back to 1986-levels by population weighted-averages, and to
1997-levels by country-averages. A record of 42 countries are autocratizing, hosting
43% of the world’s population. Autocracies are home to almost 72% of the world’s
population and generate 46% of global GDP/ppp.
Yet, we also report on eight cases of defiance in the face of the global wave of autocratization. A novel analysis of these eight U-turns demonstrates that executive constraints, mass mobilization, alternation in power, a unified opposition coalescing
with civil society, and international democracy support and protection seem to have
played an important role in the reversals. Extending existing literature, our analysis
illustrates conditions under which contemporary autocratization can be stopped and
reversed. These findings may serve as a useful starting point for causal analyses of stopping and reversing contemporary autocratization as well as failures to do so.
We should not generalize from the study of a few cases selected on the dependent
variable without counterfactuals. We thus encourage scholars to analyse these cases
and their counterfactuals more thoroughly, including the ways U-turns differ from
cases where autocratization was successful. That would improve our understanding
of both autocratization and its reversal. Yet, given that the five elements seem to
have been important across many of the eight U-turn cases that otherwise differ substantially and are disbursed across world regions, the elements pointed to in our analysis at a minimum have the potential to travel across contexts.
In terms of the state of the world in 2022, the autocratizing trend far outweighs that
of the U-turns. We do not find evidence suggesting that the wave of autocratization is
slowing down, or that the influence of autocratic countries is declining – quite the
opposite. However, the U-turn cases demonstrate defiance in the face of the predominant autocratization trend that we have seen little of before.


Notes


1. Coppedge et al., V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v13.


2. Lührmann and Lindberg, “The Third Wave of Autocratization.”
3. We focus mostly on changes in V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) in this article. It captures both electoral and liberal aspects of democracy and goes from the lowest (0) to the highest
(1) levels of democracy. The electoral component is measured by the Electoral Democracy
Index (EDI) that captures the extent to which all elements of Robert Dahl’s famous articulation
of “polyarchy” are present, including the quality of elections, universal suffrage, freedoms of
expression and association, and an independent media capable of presenting alternative
views. The Liberal Component Index (LCI) captures the liberal aspects including checks and
balances on the executive, respect for civil liberties and individual rights, the rule of law,
and the independence of the legislature and the judiciary. Dahl, Polyarchy.
4. The exact calculation of these numbers is associated with some amount of uncertainty that is
inherent in the data. For each variable in the V-Dem dataset, estimates and confidence intervals
are calculated from 900 random draws from the full posterior distribution. Recalculations done
in the process of data curation each time involve a new set of 900 random draws that affect both
point estimates and confidence intervals up to, typically, their third decimal. Borderline cases,
which are very close to thresholds for whether confidence intervals are overlapping or not, can
be affected by randomness in draws. There are eight borderline cases this year where differences in random draws between the first rendition of the v13 dataset (which we used for the
Democracy Report 2023) and the final version (posted on the V-Dem website) could have
led to changes: Chile, Ghana, Mozambique, the United States, Mexico, Portugal, Kosovo,
and Kenya. For consistency reasons, we continue using the first rendition of the v13 dataset
in this article and thus keep the classification used in the Democracy Report 2023. Chile,
Ghana, Mozambique, and the United States are thus classified in this article as autocratizers
while Mexico and Portugal are not; Kenya and Kosovo could have been classified as democratizers but are not. We nevertheless stress that a degree of caution is advisable when interpreting
classification of the borderline cases.
5. Boese et al., “How Democracies Prevail;” Gamboa, Resisting backsliding; Laebens and Lührmann, “What Halts Democratic Erosion?”; Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev, “Standing up
Against Autocratization.”
6. Lührmann et al., “Regimes of the World (RoW).”
7. Huntington, The Third Wave.
8. Lührmann et al., “Regimes of the World (RoW).”
9. Percentages are rounded throughout the article. The 72% mentioned here builds aggregating
rounded figures for closed and electoral autocracies on Figure 2. Population data come from
the World Bank included in v.13 of the V-Dem dataset.
10. On the LDI and the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), see endnote 3. The Deliberative Component Index (DCI) captures to what extent the deliberative principle of democracy is
achieved. It assesses the deliberative process by which decisions are made in a polity.
11. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated in local currency unites. GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (ppp) is GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing
power parity of different currencies.
12. There is a slight change in this figure from the version published in the Democracy Report 2023:
A difference between the first rendition of the v13 dataset used for the analysis here and the
final version led to the inclusion of Guinea-Bissau in the graph above and the exclusion of Guatemala. See footnote 4 for the explanation.
13. Boese et al., “How Democracies Prevail.”
14. In this section, we elaborate on the analysis in V-Dem’s Democracy Report 2023 and connect it
with broader academic literature and debates.
15. In the final stages of preparing this article, we found three more potential cases of U-turns over
the last 10 years that could have been included in the analysis: Lesotho, Nepal, and Romania.
Future studies should consider including them in the analysis.
16. We define that the difference is statistically significant if confidence intervals do not overlap
and substantial if the difference is greater than 0.05.
17. Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get.”
18. Boese et al., “How Democracies Prevail.”
19. Medzihorsky and Lindberg,”Walking the Talk.”


[20. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/slovenia-jansa-golob-backsliding-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/slovenia-jansa-golob-backsliding-democracy/)
[democracy/.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/26/slovenia-jansa-golob-backsliding-democracy/)
[21. https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/nations-transit/2016.](https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/nations-transit/2016)
[22. https://rsf.org/en/analyse_regionale/635.](https://rsf.org/en/analyse_regionale/635)
23. Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding”; Lührmann and Lindberg, “The Third Wave of
Autocratization.”
24. O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.”
25. Boese et al., “How Democracies Prevail”; Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev, “Standing up Against
Autocratization”; Laebens and Lührmann, “What Halts Democratic Erosion?”
26. Shin and Moon, “South Korea after Impeachment.”
[27. https://www.sgi-network.org/2022/Slovenia/Executive_Accountability.](https://www.sgi-network.org/2022/Slovenia/Executive_Accountability)
28. Ibid.
29. Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev, “Standing up Against Autocratization.”
30. Meng, “Constraining dictatorship”; Rio, “Strategic Uncertainty.”
[31. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/5/508979.pdf.](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/5/508979.pdf)
32. Laebens and Lührmann, “What Halts Democratic Erosion?”; Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev,
“Standing up Against Autocratization.”
[33. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/05/maldives-in-chaos-as-government-accuses-](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/05/maldives-in-chaos-as-government-accuses-supreme-court-of-trying-to-impeach-president)
[supreme-court-of-trying-to-impeach-president.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/05/maldives-in-chaos-as-government-accuses-supreme-court-of-trying-to-impeach-president)
[34. https://www.eods.eu/library/eu_eom_zambia_2021_-_final_report.pdf.](https://www.eods.eu/library/eu_eom_zambia_2021_-_final_report.pdf)
35. Laebens and Lührmann, “What Halts Democratic Erosion?”
36. E.g. Teorell, Determinants of Democratization; Brancati, Democracy Protests.
37. Sato and Wahman, “Elite Coordination and Popular Protest.”
38. Laebens and Lührmann, “What Halts Democratic Erosion?”
39. Pérez-Liñán, “A Two-Level Theory of Presidential Instability.”
40. Hellmeier and Weidmann, “Pulling the Strings?”
41. Sato and Arce, “Resistance to Populism.”
[42. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/27/slovenian-protesters-rally-against-degradation-of-democracy/.](https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/27/slovenian-protesters-rally-against-degradation-of-democracy/)
[43. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/2/protests-in-maldives-amid-pressure-to-release-prisoners.](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/2/protests-in-maldives-amid-pressure-to-release-prisoners)
[44. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32771233.](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32771233)
45. Guachalla, et al., “Latin America Erupts.”
46. Ekiert et al., “Ruling by Other Means”; Hellmeier and Weidmann, “Pulling the Strings?”
47. Chang and Park, “A Heterogeneous Rally Effect for a Corrupt President.”
48. Lehoucq, “Bolivia’s Citizen Revolt.”
49. E.g. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa; Edgell et al., “When and Where Do Elections
Matter?”; Donno, “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.”
50. E.g. Medzihorsky and Lindberg, “Walking the Talk”; Haggard, S., and Kaufman, Backsliding.
51. Resnick, “How Zambia’s Opposition Won.”
[52. https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/nations-transit/2016;](https://freedomhouse.org/country/moldova/nations-transit/2016) [https://www.nytimes.com/](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/world/europe/moldova-parliament-dismisses-government-amid-bank-scandal.html)
[2015/10/30/world/europe/moldova-parliament-dismisses-government-amid-bank-scandal.html.](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/world/europe/moldova-parliament-dismisses-government-amid-bank-scandal.html)
[53. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/75329.](https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/75329)
[54. https://www.idea.int/blog/slovenian-elections-win-democracy-loss-populism-europe.](https://www.idea.int/blog/slovenian-elections-win-democracy-loss-populism-europe)
55. Sato and Wahman, “Elite Coordination and Popular Protest;” Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev,
“Standing up Against Autocratization.”
56. Cleary and Öztürk, “When Does Backsliding Lead to Breakdown?”; Gamboa, Resisting backsliding.
57. Ibid.
58. Leininger, “International Democracy Promotion in Times of Autocratization.”
59. Laebens and Lührmann, “What Halts Democratic Erosion?”
[60. https://www.rferl.org/a/chisinau-protesters-rally-against-moldova-government/32278318.html.](https://www.rferl.org/a/chisinau-protesters-rally-against-moldova-government/32278318.html)
[61. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64113400.](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64113400)
62. There is also a growing concern about mobilization supporting the previous autocratizing
regime in South Korea. Yang, “Defending ‘Liberal Democracy’?” Yet, our data indicates that
the intensity of mobilization for autocracy did not rise substantially since the democratic
comeback.
63. E.g., Hellmeier and Bernhard, “Regime Transformation from Below.”


Acknowledgements


We thank Evie Papada, Lisa Gastaldi, Tamara Köhler, and Natalia Natsika for their contributions to
the Democracy Report 2023.


Disclosure statement


No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).


Funding


This research was made possible through support by Vetenskapsrådet [grant number 2018-016114],
Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg [grant
number 2018.0144], and H2020 European Research Council [grant number 724191], as well as by
internal grants from the Vice-Chancellor’s office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and
the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg.


Notes on contributors


Felix Wiebrecht is a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg.
His research focuses on authoritarian politics and institutions as well as democratization and autocratization processes.


Yuko Sato is a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her
research focuses on popular protests, voting behavior, democratization, and autocratization, with a
regional focus on Latin America. Her previous research appeared in Electoral Studies, Policy
Studies Journal, and Democratization.


Marina Nord is a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her
research focuses on the interaction of political and economic systems around the world, with a focus
on economic sources of regime (in)stability.


Martin Lundstedt is an assistant researcher at the V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science,
University of Gothenburg.


Fabio Angiolillo is a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. His
research focuses on comparative politics, political institutions, authoritarian regimes, and political behavior.


Staffan I. Lindberg is Professor of Political Science and Director of the university-wide research infrastructure at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, founding Principal Investigator of Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), founding Director of the national research infrastructure DEMSCORE,
Wallenberg Academy Fellow, author/editor of several books, and 60+ articles on democracy, elections,
democratization, autocratization, accountability, clientelism, sequence analysis methods, women’s
representation, and voting behavior in journals such as APSR, AJPS, Political Analysis, Democratization, World Development, World Politics, etc.


ORCID


Felix Wiebrecht [http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9159-5024](http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9159-5024)
Yuko Sato [http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7458-6134](http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7458-6134)
Marina Nord [http://orcid.org/0009-0009-4044-6721](http://orcid.org/0009-0009-4044-6721)
Martin Lundstedt [http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5847-2671](http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5847-2671)
Fabio Angiolillo [http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1474-6500](http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1474-6500)
Staffan I. Lindberg [http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0386-7390](http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0386-7390)


Bibliography


Bermeo, N. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 5–19.
Boese, V. A., A. Edgell, S. Hellmeier, S. F. Maerz, and S. I. Lindberg. “How Democracies Prevail:
Democratic Resilience as a Two-Stage Process.” Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 885–907.
Boese, V. A., M. Lundstedt, K. Morrison, Y. Sato, and S. I. Lindberg. “State of the World 2021:
Autocratization Changing Its Nature?” Democratization 29, no. 6 (2022): 983–1013.
Brancati, D. Democracy Protests: Origins, Features and Significance. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2016.
Chang, K., and J. Park. “A Heterogeneous Rally Effect for a Corrupt President: Partisanship, Regional
Sentiment, and Anxiety Against a Corruption Scandal.” Democratization 27, no. 8 (2020): 1354–
1375.
Cleary, M. R., and A. Öztürk. “When Does Backsliding Lead to Breakdown? Uncertainty and
Opposition Strategies in Democracies at Risk.” Perspectives on Politics 20, no. 1 (2022): 205–221.
Coppedge, M., J. Gerring, C. H. Knutsen, S. I. Lindberg, J. Teorell, D. Altman, M. Bernhard, et al. VDem Country-Year Dataset v13 (2023).
Dahl, R. A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
Donno, D. “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political
Science 57, no. 3 (2013): 703–716.
Edgell, A. B., V. Mechkova, D. Altman, M. Bernhard, and S. I. Lindberg. “When and Where Do
Elections Matter? A Global Test of the Democratization by Elections Hypothesis, 1900–2010.”
Democratization 25, no. 3 (2018): 422–444.
Ekiert, G., E. J. Perry, and X. Yan, eds. Ruling by Other Means: State-Mobilized Movements,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
Gamboa, L. Resisting Backsliding: Opposition Strategies Against the Erosion of Democracy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Geddes, B. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative
Politics.” Political Analysis 2 (1990): 131–150.
Guachalla, V. X. V., C. Hummel, S. Handlin, and A. E. Smith. “Latin America Erupts: When Does
Competitive Authoritarianism Take Root?” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 3 (2021): 63–77.
Haggard, S., and R. Kaufman. Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Hellmeier, S., and M. Bernhard. “Regime Transformation from Below: Mobilization for Democracy
[and Autocracy from 1900 to 2021.” Comparative Political Studies, no. 0(0) (2023): 1–33. doi:10.](https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152793)
[1177/00104140231152793](https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152793)
Hellmeier, S., N. B, and N. B. Weidmann. “Pulling the Strings? The Strategic Use of Pro-Government
Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes.” Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 1 (2020): 71–108.
Huntington, S. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Laebens, M. G., and A. Lührmann. “What Halts Democratic Erosion? The Changing Role of
Accountability.” Democratization 28, no. 5 (2021): 908–928.
Lehoucq, F. “Bolivia’s Citizen Revolt.” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (2020): 130–144.
Leininger, J. “International Democracy Promotion in Times of Autocratization.” From Supporting to
Protecting Democracy (No. 21/2022). IDOS Discussion Paper (2022).
Lindberg, S. I. Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
Lührmann, A., and S. I. Lindberg. “A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New about It?”
Democratization 26, no. 7 (2019): 1095–1113.
Lührmann, A., M. Tannenberg, and S. I. Lindberg. “Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues
for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes.” Politics and Governance 6, no. 1 (2018): 60–77.
Medzihorsky, J., and S. I. Lindberg. “Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties.” Party
Politics (Forthcoming).
Meng, A. Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2020.
O’Donnell, G. A. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3
(1998): 112–126.
Papada, E., D. Altman, F. Angiolillo, L. Gastaldi, T. Köhler, M. Lundstedt, N. Natsika, M. Nord, Y.
Sato, F. Wiebrecht, and S. I. Lindberg. Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy


Report 2023. Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem
Institute), 2023.
Pérez-Liñán, A. “A Two-Level Theory of Presidential Instability.” Latin American Politics and Society
56, no. 1 (2014): 34–54.
Resnick, D. “How Zambia’s Opposition Won.” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 1 (2022): 70–84.
Río, A. D. “Strategic Uncertainty and Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies: A Cross-National
Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies 55, no. 13 (2022): 2250–2282.
Sato, Y., and M. Arce. “Resistance to Populism.” Democratization 29, no. 6 (2022): 1137–1156.
Sato, Y., and M. Wahman. “Elite Coordination and Popular Protest: The Joint Effect on Democratic
Change.” Democratization 26, no. 8 (2019): 1419–1438.
Shin, G.-W., and R. Moon. “South Korea after Impeachment.” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 4 (2017):
117–131.
Teorell, J. Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Tomini, L., S. Gibril, and V. Bochev. “Standing up Against Autocratization Across Political Regimes: A
Comparative Analysis of Resistance Actors and Strategies.” Democratization 30, no. 1 (2023): 119–138.
Yang, M. “Defending ‘Liberal Democracy’? Why Older South Koreans Took to the Streets against the
2016–2017 Candlelight Protests.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2020): 365–382.